公共流动性需求与央行独立性

ERN: Monetary Policy (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-11-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3518309

J. Barthélemy, Guillaume Plantin, Eric Mengus

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引用次数: 5

摘要

本文研究了私人对公共流动性的需求如何影响中央银行相对于财政当局的独立性。虽然向私营部门提供流动性为财政和货币当局彼此之间创造了一定程度的自由，但我们表明，最有能力吸引私人流动性需求的当局最终可以将其观点强加给对方。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Public Liquidity Demand and Central Bank Independence

This paper studies how private demand for public liquidity affects the independence of a central bank vis-a-vis the fiscal authority. Whereas supplying liquidity to the private sector creates degrees of freedom for fiscal and monetary authorities vis-a-vis each other, we show that the authority that is most able to attract private liquidity demand can ultimately impose its views to the other.

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来源期刊

ERN: Monetary Policy (Topic)

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