银行救助和内部纾困

Raluca A. Roman
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引用次数: 4

摘要

在全球金融危机期间,当银行倒闭威胁到经济和金融稳定时,政府出手纾困。危机过后,各国政府试图通过提高资本要求、加强监管规则和监督,以及引入内部纾困条款(要求债权人和/或股权持有人承担损失并帮助对陷入困境的银行进行资本重组)来结束纾困。一些重要的政策问题是,救助是否有效地实现了其主要目标,以及作为替代方案的内部纾困是否能有效地减少对救助的需求,并解决未来面临困境和破产的金融机构。本章概述了美国和欧盟最近关于纾困和内部纾困的文献和其他证据,以更好地理解它们的经济和社会成本与收益。我们还简要讨论了处理陷入困境的大型金融机构的其他方法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bank Bailouts and Bail-Ins
During the global financial crisis, governments bailed out banks when their failures threatened to undermine economic and financial stability. After the crisis, governments tried to end bailouts by raising capital requirements, increasing supervisory rules and oversight, and introducing bail-in provisions that require creditors and/or equity holders to assume losses and help recapitalize distressed banks. Some important policy questions are whether bailouts have been effective in meeting their primary goals and whether bail-ins as alternatives can be effective in reducing the need for bailouts and resolving financial institutions facing distress and failure going forward. This chapter surveys the recent literature and other evidence from the US and EU on bailouts and bail-ins to better understand their economic and social costs and benefits. We also discuss briefly other methods to deal with the resolution of distressed large financial institutions.
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