当捐赠人被限制给予最低金额时的慈善捐赠

E. Cartwright, Zarak Mirza
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在某些情况下,慈善机构坚持要求捐赠者捐赠超过最低金额。在其他情况下,慈善机构以一种表明有最低捐赠额的方式提出资金呼吁。那么,如果规定最低捐赠额,对慈善捐赠有什么影响呢?我们首先提供了一个简单的理论模型,表明这种效应是模糊的。然后,我们报告两个实验室实验的结果,考虑非常不同的设置。在第一个实验中,给予的唯一动机是内在动机。这里我们发现最小约束降低了给予。第二个实验涉及到有外在激励的群体互动。这里我们发现最小约束增加了给予。我们的研究结果表明,最小约束的效果可能主要取决于内在和外在激励的混合。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Charitable Giving When Donors are Constrained to Give a Minimum Amount
In some instances charities insist on donors giving more than a minimum amount. In other instances charities frame appeals for funds in a way that suggests there is a minimum donation. So, what are the effects on charitable giving if a minimum donation is required? We first provide a simple theoretical model that shows the effects are ambiguous. We then report the results of two lab experiments that consider very different settings. In the first experiment the only incentive to give is intrinsic motivation. Here we find that a minimum constraint lowers giving. The second experiment involves group interaction with extrinsic incentives to give. Here we find that a minimum constraint increases giving. Our results suggest that the effects of a minimum constraint may depend critically on the mix of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives.
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