伪装谎言——作弊游戏中的形象问题和部分谎言

PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-09-17 DOI:10.1257/MIC.20170193

Kiryl Khalmetski, Dirk Sliwka

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引用次数: 78

摘要

我们研究了欺骗博弈中的均衡报告行为，当代理人有固定的撒谎成本和不被视为骗子的形象问题时。我们的研究表明，均衡是自然产生的，在这种均衡中，具有低撒谎成本的行为体随机分布在一组最高潜力报告中。这种均衡导致报告的分布与观察到的实验模式一致。我们还发现，更高的形象关注度会导致谎言报道范围的扩大，而说谎的固定成本的影响则相反。(jel c72, d82, z13)

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Disguising Lies - Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games

We study equilibrium reporting behavior in cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential reports. Such equilibria induce a distribution of reports in line with observed experimental patterns. We also find that higher image concerns lead to an increase in the range of reported lies, while the effect of the fixed cost of lying is the opposite. (JEL C72, D82, Z13)

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PSN: Game Theory (Topic)

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