{"title":"早期金融思想中的不确定性和不平等:约翰·希克斯作为奈特和凯恩斯的读者","authors":"Roni Hirsch","doi":"10.1093/cje/beab032","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n The article examines the early reception of Knight’s and Keynes’ accounts of uncertainty and their overlooked role in the development of financial economics. Knight’s famous distinction between risk and uncertainty bore a deep social and political significance, dividing humanity into risk-takers and the risk-averse. This same distinction, I argue, along with its asymmetries of power and rewards, was reproduced in Hicks’ 1939 dynamic equilibrium model. It was recast as an opposition between hedgers and speculators in a market for risk, on the one hand, and between institutional investors and the general public, on the other. Hicks’s synthesis heeds both Knightian and Keynesian notions of uncertainty, adopting the former’s idea of profit-earning uncertainty-bearers and the latter’s definition of money as an imperfect though widely used hedge against uncertainty. Closer to Knight than to Keynes, Hicks’s model raises a fundamental political question: is inequality a price worth paying for greater certainty in economic life?","PeriodicalId":253619,"journal":{"name":"History of Economics eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Uncertainty and Inequality in Early Financial Thought: John Hicks as a Reader of Knight and Keynes\",\"authors\":\"Roni Hirsch\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/cje/beab032\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n The article examines the early reception of Knight’s and Keynes’ accounts of uncertainty and their overlooked role in the development of financial economics. Knight’s famous distinction between risk and uncertainty bore a deep social and political significance, dividing humanity into risk-takers and the risk-averse. This same distinction, I argue, along with its asymmetries of power and rewards, was reproduced in Hicks’ 1939 dynamic equilibrium model. It was recast as an opposition between hedgers and speculators in a market for risk, on the one hand, and between institutional investors and the general public, on the other. Hicks’s synthesis heeds both Knightian and Keynesian notions of uncertainty, adopting the former’s idea of profit-earning uncertainty-bearers and the latter’s definition of money as an imperfect though widely used hedge against uncertainty. Closer to Knight than to Keynes, Hicks’s model raises a fundamental political question: is inequality a price worth paying for greater certainty in economic life?\",\"PeriodicalId\":253619,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"History of Economics eJournal\",\"volume\":\"16 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"History of Economics eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/beab032\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"History of Economics eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/beab032","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Uncertainty and Inequality in Early Financial Thought: John Hicks as a Reader of Knight and Keynes
The article examines the early reception of Knight’s and Keynes’ accounts of uncertainty and their overlooked role in the development of financial economics. Knight’s famous distinction between risk and uncertainty bore a deep social and political significance, dividing humanity into risk-takers and the risk-averse. This same distinction, I argue, along with its asymmetries of power and rewards, was reproduced in Hicks’ 1939 dynamic equilibrium model. It was recast as an opposition between hedgers and speculators in a market for risk, on the one hand, and between institutional investors and the general public, on the other. Hicks’s synthesis heeds both Knightian and Keynesian notions of uncertainty, adopting the former’s idea of profit-earning uncertainty-bearers and the latter’s definition of money as an imperfect though widely used hedge against uncertainty. Closer to Knight than to Keynes, Hicks’s model raises a fundamental political question: is inequality a price worth paying for greater certainty in economic life?