大型匿名游戏中的最佳回复动态

PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-03-18 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2028522

Y. Babichenko

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考虑的是拥有大量玩家的小型匿名游戏，其中每个玩家都有两个行动。对于这类游戏，我们给出了具有以下两个属性的最佳回复动态。首先，动态达到纳什近似均衡很快(在$cn\ log n$步对于某些常数$c>0$)。其次，对于某常数c'>0$，动态系统的极限频率至少为$1-e^{-c'n}$。

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Best-Reply Dynamics in Large Anonymous Games

We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players $n$ where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most $cn\ log n$ steps for some constant $c>0$). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least $1-e^{-c'n}$ for some constant $c'>0$.

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PSN: Game Theory (Topic)

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