面对转换成本的进入时机及其福利效应:来自当日杂货配送平台的证据

Vitoria Rabello de Castro
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在过去的五年里,有着不同商业模式的公司大举进入了在线杂货市场。大多数公司都提供订阅服务,而且数据显示,消费者很少在这些服务之间切换。我发现转换成本显著影响消费者的平台选择,这表明未来市场力量的潜在运用。我估计了一家大型在线零售商收购一家全国性食品杂货连锁店对福利的影响,并强调了这一需求特征和配送成本结构所起的作用。我模拟了两个大型平台之间的竞争。首先是参与合并的主要在线零售商。其竞争对手是一个入门成本较低的独立平台。这些平台在一个动态的进入游戏中竞争,两种对立的力量影响着进入的时机。我发现,企业以更高的进入成本为代价,追求由消费者锁定造成的先发优势,从而导致早期进入的巨大成本。我估计,在被收购之前,这家大型在线零售商的入门成本非常高。此次收购降低了这一成本,对竞争对手构成了竞争威胁。消费者锁定有助于提高两家公司提前进入市场的风险,加速进入新市场,并因提前进入而为消费者带来超过8亿美元的福利收益。此外,我发现两个平台之间的合并,导致垄断,将大大推迟进入。研究结果表明,进入时机的战略竞争对并购的福利效应起着重要作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Entry Timing in the Face of Switching Costs and its Welfare Effects: Evidence from Same-Day Grocery Delivery Platforms
The online grocery market has seen significant entry over the last five years by firms with different business models. Most firms offer subscriptions, and, in the data, consumers rarely switch between them. I find that switching costs significantly affect consumer platform choice, suggesting potential for future exercise of market power. I estimate the welfare impact of the acquisition of a national grocery chain by of a major online retailer and highlight the role played by this feature of demand and by delivery cost structures. I model competition between two large platforms. The first is the major online retailer engaging in the merger. The rival is an independent platform with low entry costs. The platforms compete in a dynamic entry game, and two opposing forces influence entry timing. I find that firms chase a first-mover advantage resulting from consumer lock-in at the expense of higher entry costs, leading to significant costs of early entry. I estimate that, before the acquisition, the major online retailer had very large entry costs. The acquisition reduced this cost, posing a competitive threat to the rival. Consumer lock-in then contributed to raising the stakes of early entry for both firms, accelerating entry across new markets and generating over \$ 800 M in welfare gains to consumers due to earlier entry. Further, I find that a merger between the two platforms, resulting in a monopoly, would delay entry significantly. These results show that strategic competition in entry timing plays an important role in mergers' welfare effect.
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