为了别人的缘故而信仰

S. Keller
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引用次数: 15

摘要

摘要:你很在意别人对你的看法。别人对你的看法决定了你是否有良好的声誉,你是否得到同龄人的尊重,你的朋友是否真的喜欢你。你关心别人的信仰是有道理的,因为别人的信仰直接关系到你的幸福水平。你的信仰可以影响他人的幸福,就像他们的信仰可以影响你的一样。你的信念如何影响他人的幸福与你的信念是否有证据支持是另一回事。有时,你可以通过调整你的信念来对他人的福祉做出反应,而不仅仅是对证据做出反应,从而使他人受益。通常,你没有强有力的理由来调整你的信仰,以回应对他人利益的考虑。但如果这个人是你的朋友,情况就不一样了。在一些完美的友谊中,每个朋友为另一个朋友提供的支持延伸到他们愿意调整自己的信念,以使对方受益,即使这使得他们的信念不太可能得到证据的支持。在我们的友谊中,我们有信仰的理由,而不是直接来自于证据,有时与证据相竞争。这一说法与广为流传的亚里士多德观点相冲突,亚里士多德认为,良好的友谊是基于美德的。但它符合一种更合理的关于友谊的观点,即友谊的功能是帮助我们应对我们不是完全善良的事实,并满足我们因为我们不是完全善良而产生的需求。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Belief for Someone Else’s Sake
ABSTRACT:You care about what others believe about you. What others believe about you determines whether you have a good reputation, whether you have the respect of your peers, and whether your friends genuinely like you. Your caring about others’ beliefs makes sense, because others’ beliefs bear directly upon your level of well-being. Your beliefs can influence others’ well-being, as much as their beliefs can influence yours. How your beliefs influence another’s well-being is a different matter from whether your beliefs are supported by the evidence. Sometimes you can benefit another person by regulating your beliefs in response to considerations of her well-being, not (only) of the evidence. Usually, you do not have strong reasons to regulate your beliefs in response to considerations of the interests of others. But it can be different when the person in question is your friend. Within some perfectly good friendships, the support that each friend provides for the other extends as far as their being willing to regulate their beliefs with the goal of benefiting the other, even if that makes it less likely that their beliefs will be supported by the evidence. Within our friendships, we then have reasons for belief that do not arise directly from, and sometimes compete with, reasons provided by evidence. This claim conflicts with the widespread Aristotelian view that good friendship is oriented to virtue. But it fits with a more plausible view about friendship, on which the function of friendship is to help us cope with the fact that we are not fully virtuous, and to serve needs that we have because we are not fully virtuous.
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CiteScore
2.40
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