{"title":"虚拟与实体政府分权:对腐败和影子经济的影响","authors":"R. Goel, James W. Saunoris","doi":"10.1111/pbaf.12105","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the relative effectiveness of cross‐national virtual decentralization and physical decentralization of government functions on corruption and the shadow economy. Results show that while virtual decentralization reduces both corruption and the shadow economy, physical decentralization reduces only the shadow economy. The e‐government results are robust to alternate measures and specifications, while those of government tiers are not.","PeriodicalId":135866,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Public Budgeting & Finance","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"17","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Virtual versus Physical Government Decentralization: Effects on Corruption and the Shadow Economy\",\"authors\":\"R. Goel, James W. Saunoris\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/pbaf.12105\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper examines the relative effectiveness of cross‐national virtual decentralization and physical decentralization of government functions on corruption and the shadow economy. Results show that while virtual decentralization reduces both corruption and the shadow economy, physical decentralization reduces only the shadow economy. The e‐government results are robust to alternate measures and specifications, while those of government tiers are not.\",\"PeriodicalId\":135866,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Wiley-Blackwell: Public Budgeting & Finance\",\"volume\":\"25 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"17\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Wiley-Blackwell: Public Budgeting & Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12105\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Wiley-Blackwell: Public Budgeting & Finance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12105","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Virtual versus Physical Government Decentralization: Effects on Corruption and the Shadow Economy
This paper examines the relative effectiveness of cross‐national virtual decentralization and physical decentralization of government functions on corruption and the shadow economy. Results show that while virtual decentralization reduces both corruption and the shadow economy, physical decentralization reduces only the shadow economy. The e‐government results are robust to alternate measures and specifications, while those of government tiers are not.