《现代公司经济学宣言

William Lazonick, S. Blankenburg, J. Froud, Mary O’Sullivan, C. Sauviat, A. Rebérioux, Ha-Joon Chang, M. Mazzucato, Grahame F. Thompson, S. Keen, P. Quattrone, C. May, Neil M. Lancastle, Barbara Czarniawska, D. Knights, L. Horn, I. Talmud, Oleg Komlik, H. Schwardt, K. Robson, T. Hines, R. Wright, M. Houston, Mehmet Ali Dikerdem, Maureen Boland, M. Djelic, Brendan O'rourke, N. Kaul, J. Holmwood, Timothy Kuhn, P. Ainley, Dawa Sherpa, P. Welch, K. Reader, Jan Čulík, K. McSorley, N. Edmond, S. Fleetwood, Andrew M. Fischer, G. Delalieux, Helena Syna Desivilya, D. Leech, M. Loughlin, W. Maley, D. Wield, M. Nissanke, Roger Brown, M. Addis, Stuart Farquhar, D. Cooper, Chris Carter, M. Sabaratnam, M. Aluchna, R. Gill, A. Bryer, P. Beusch, N. Harfoush, H. Vrolijk, B. Cooke, M. Pirson, D. Jacobs, A. Contu, Nihel Chabrak, P. Ireland, J. Matthaei, Vincenzo Bavoso, Tanweer Ali, Lorenzo Massa, David Gindis, M. Smith, J. Chanteau, Robert F Coles, M. Palazzi, Roger Martin, H. Willmott, J. Veldman
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引用次数: 0

摘要

从20世纪初开始,现代“资本主义”公司的一个主要特征,特别是在美国,是公开交易股票形式的资产所有权与受薪经理对公司资源的配置控制的分离。到20世纪50年代,一些人将管理控制的大型企业描述为“有灵魂的”公司,在这种公司中,资源的配置导致了社会福利的提高。然而,在20世纪60年代,一些保守派学者将目光投向了被称为“公司控制市场”的市场力量,以确保作为雇员的管理者在分配公司资源时优先考虑股东。这种公司控制权市场可能使敌意收购成为可能,在这种情况下,积累了一家公司大量公开股权的股东可以约束管理者,让他们按照“市场”认为有效的方式配置资源。市场配置可以控制管理组织的概念随后在理论上发展起来,其基础是公司(实际上是任何公司)可以被概念化为“合同的联系”或“资产的集合”。新古典主义经济学家没有将公司视为具有独特历史和竞争能力的社会组织,公众股东在其中扮演了次要角色,而是将公司概念化为资源所有者之间的一套自愿契约,以及具有不同市场决定回报率的资产组合。这种对公司的概念化与占主导地位的新古典主义市场经济理论相吻合,产生了一些影响。我们提供了一些经济学基本原理的总结,以帮助防止分析错误,这些错误可能对公司产生严重和破坏性的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Modern Corporation Statement on Economics
From the early decades of the twentieth century, a dominant characteristic of the modern "capitalist" corporation, especially in the United States, was the separation of asset ownership in the form of publicly traded shares from allocative control over the corporation's resources by salaried managers. By the 1950s some depicted managerial-controlled large enterprise as the "soulful" corporation in which the allocation of resources resulted in enhanced social welfare. In the 1960s, however, some conservative academics looked to market forces, dubbed the "market for corporate control", to ensure that managers as employees would give primacy to shareholders in the allocation of corporate resources. This market for corporate control could enable hostile takeovers in which shareholders who accumulated large public equity stakes in a company could discipline managers to allocate resources in ways that "the market" deemed to be efficient. The notion that market allocation could control managerial organization was then developed theoretically based on the conceptualisation that the corporation (and indeed any firm) could be conceptualised as a "nexus of contracts" or a "collection of assets". Rather than view the corporation as a social organization with its unique history and competitive capabilities in which public shareholders had come to play a peripheral role, neoclassical economists conceptualised the corporation as a set of voluntary contracts among owners of resources and as a portfolio of assets with different market-determined rates of returns. This conceptualisation of the corporation to fit with the dominant neoclassical theory of the market economy had implications. We provide this Summary of certain fundamentals of economics in an effort to help prevent analytical errors which can have severe and damaging effects on corporations.
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