反垄断危害及其因果关系

Herbert Hovenkamp
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引用次数: 3

摘要

原告应如何证明反垄断行为的危害?调查自然分为两个问题:第一,危害的性质是什么?第二,因果关系的证明需要什么?评估危害的最佳标准是可能的或合理预期的产出影响。反垄断的目标应该是产出与可持续竞争相一致。因此,证明因果关系的标准取决于两件事:执行者的身份和原告寻求的救济。这并不一定取决于原告寻求执行的是哪一部反垄断法。对于公共机构来说,执法既包括对过去危害的谴责,也包括对未来风险的管理。与公共执法的大多数领域一样,人们担心的是,如果不加以限制,可能会产生有害的反竞争后果。虽然证明实际损害具有重要的证据意义,但在大多数情况下,公共当局不需要证明损害已经实际发生,而只需证明被质疑的行为构成了将会发生这种损害的不合理危险。相比之下,私人执法者在更严格的因果关系要求下运作,要求损害赔偿诉讼的实际伤害,或个人威胁伤害的禁令。这些差异在授权执法行动的各种联邦法规中是明确的。它们也类似于一般法律制度中的要件划分,特别是对侵权行为的公法与私法的区分。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Antitrust Harm and Causation
How should plaintiffs show harm from antitrust violations? The inquiry naturally breaks into two issues: first, what is the nature of the harm? and second, what does proof of causation require? The best criterion for assessing harm is likely or reasonably anticipated output effects. Antitrust’s goal should be output as high as is consistent with sustainable competition. The standard for proof of causation then depends on two things: the identity of the enforcer and the remedy that the plaintiff is seeking. It does not necessarily depend on which antitrust statute the plaintiff is seeking to enforce. For public agencies, enforcement involves both the condemnation of past harm and the management of future risks. The concern, as in most areas of public enforcement, is with behavior that is likely to have harmful anticompetitive consequences unless it is restrained. While a showing of actual harm has evidentiary importance, in most cases the public authorities need not show that the harm has actually occurred, but only that the challenged conduct poses an unreasonable danger that it will occur. By contrast, private enforcers operate under stricter causation requirements that require an actual injury for damages actions, or individually threatened injury for an injunction. These differences are explicit in the various federal statutes that authorize enforcement actions. They are also similar to the division of requirements in the legal system generally, particularly in the distinction between public criminal law and the private law of tortious conduct.
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