{"title":"认知模型中的自我系统","authors":"U. Ramamurthy, S. Franklin, Pulin Agrawal","doi":"10.1142/S1793843012400185","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists have proposed various forms of a \"self\" in humans and animals. All of these selves seem to have a basis in some form of consciousness. The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) [Baars, 1988, 2003] suggests a mostly unconscious, many-layered self-system. In this paper, we consider several issues that arise from attempts to include a self-system in a software agent/cognitive robot. We explore these issues in the context of the LIDA model [Baars and Franklin, 2009; Ramamurthy et al., 2006] which implements the Global Workspace Theory.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"11","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Self-system in a model of cognition\",\"authors\":\"U. Ramamurthy, S. Franklin, Pulin Agrawal\",\"doi\":\"10.1142/S1793843012400185\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists have proposed various forms of a \\\"self\\\" in humans and animals. All of these selves seem to have a basis in some form of consciousness. The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) [Baars, 1988, 2003] suggests a mostly unconscious, many-layered self-system. In this paper, we consider several issues that arise from attempts to include a self-system in a software agent/cognitive robot. We explore these issues in the context of the LIDA model [Baars and Franklin, 2009; Ramamurthy et al., 2006] which implements the Global Workspace Theory.\",\"PeriodicalId\":418022,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Machine Consciousness\",\"volume\":\"79 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"11\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Machine Consciousness\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843012400185\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843012400185","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists have proposed various forms of a "self" in humans and animals. All of these selves seem to have a basis in some form of consciousness. The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) [Baars, 1988, 2003] suggests a mostly unconscious, many-layered self-system. In this paper, we consider several issues that arise from attempts to include a self-system in a software agent/cognitive robot. We explore these issues in the context of the LIDA model [Baars and Franklin, 2009; Ramamurthy et al., 2006] which implements the Global Workspace Theory.
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