时间策略博弈一种在时间维度上管理战略计划的新的博弈理论

S. Sarcià
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引用次数: 6

摘要

背景:在过去的60多年里,世界各地发生了许多不同类型的战争。学者们将最新的战争称为第四代战争(或战争),这种战争不再是国家行为体之间的对抗,而是非国家行为体(主要是游击队/叛乱分子)与国家行为体之间的对抗。目标:由于不对称和缺乏时间框架,旧的战略博弈论(如囚徒困境)无法解释第四代战争,我们定义了这一理论的一种变体,我们称之为时间战略博弈论,目的是提出关于计划和管理军事行动(如阿富汗、伊拉克、利比亚、索马里、黎巴嫩、以色列-巴勒斯坦等)真正需要什么的讨论。方法:所定义的理论处理不对称,并包括一个时间维度。我们的定义是全新的。我们没有使用博弈论中常用的自动机方法。我们考虑了一个随时间变化的连续参数函数。在策略游戏中使用可变时间是这项工作的主要新颖之处。结果:在“定时战略博弈”定义的基础上,我们提出了“定时囚徒困境”的定义,并专门为模拟第四代战争的主要特征而建立了“IN-OUT博弈”的定义。此外,本工作的贡献还在于定义了稳定和不稳定的定时纳什均衡,这是将“纳什均衡”扩展到定时策略博弈。结论:在这项研究中,我们展示了一种模拟非对称策略游戏的方法。尽管这种新理论的适用性还有待实践检验,但这是建立一个理论框架的第一步,在这个框架中,战略游戏最终可以按时间进行分类。另外的贡献是,提议的模型是通用的,不管第四代战争;我们观察到,定时战略游戏还可以帮助建立基于价值的管理模式、挣值分析和股票市场动态。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Timed strategic games A new game theory for managing strategic plans in the time dimension
Background: Over the last 60+ years a number of wars of different kinds has been taken place worldwide. Scholars refer to the latest ones as 4th Generation wars (or warfare) where the confrontation is no longer between state actors, but between non-state actors (mainly guerrilla/insurgents) and state actors. Aims: Since the old strategic game theory (e.g. Prisoner's Dilemma) is not able to explain 4th Generation wars because of asymmetry and the lack of a timed framework, we define a variation of this theory that we call Timed Strategic Game with the aim of bringing up the discussion on what it is really needed to plan and manage military campaigns such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Lebanon, Israel-Palestine, and etc. Method: The theory being defined deals with asymmetry and includes a temporal dimension. Our definition is completely new. We did not use an automaton approach as usually done in game theory. We considered a continuous parametric function varying based upon the variable time. The use of the variable time in strategic games is the main novelty of this work. Results: Based upon the definition of “Timed Strategic Game”, we put forward the definition of “Timed Prisoner's Dilemma” and another one that we called IN-OUT game, which was set up specifically to model the main features of 4th Generation wars. Furthermore, the contribution of this work is also with the definition of Stable and Unstable Timed Nash Equilibria, which are the extension of “Nash Equilibria” to Timed Strategic Games. Conclusions: In this research we show a way of modeling asymmetric strategic games over time. Even though the suitability of the application of this new theory has to be tried out in practical terms, it is the first step to have a theoretical framework where strategic games can finally be categorized in terms of time. Additional contributions are that the proposed model is general purpose regardless of 4th Generation wars; we observed that Timed Strategic Games could also help model value-based management, earned value analysis, and share-market dynamics.
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