治理质量与信息不对称

Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments Pub Date : 2015-04-06 DOI:10.1111/fmii.12026

Ahmed Elbadry, Dimitrios Gounopoulos, Frank Skinner

{"title":"治理质量与信息不对称","authors":"Ahmed Elbadry, Dimitrios Gounopoulos, Frank Skinner","doi":"10.1111/fmii.12026","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n <p>This paper explores the relation between corporate governance and asymmetric information. We find that proxies for governance mechanisms that encourage the monitoring of managers are inversely related to proxies for asymmetric information. Specifically, greater board independence, board activeness and debt financing are significantly and inversely related to the degree of asymmetric information as reflected in bid-ask spreads, volatility of share returns, normalised share trade volumes and market value of shares traded. This implies that corporate governance mechanisms that enhance managerial monitoring lead to improvements in the informational environment of the firm.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":39670,"journal":{"name":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","volume":"24 2-3","pages":"127-157"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fmii.12026","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Governance Quality and Information Asymmetry\",\"authors\":\"Ahmed Elbadry, Dimitrios Gounopoulos, Frank Skinner\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/fmii.12026\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div>\\n <p>This paper explores the relation between corporate governance and asymmetric information. We find that proxies for governance mechanisms that encourage the monitoring of managers are inversely related to proxies for asymmetric information. Specifically, greater board independence, board activeness and debt financing are significantly and inversely related to the degree of asymmetric information as reflected in bid-ask spreads, volatility of share returns, normalised share trade volumes and market value of shares traded. This implies that corporate governance mechanisms that enhance managerial monitoring lead to improvements in the informational environment of the firm.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":39670,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments\",\"volume\":\"24 2-3\",\"pages\":\"127-157\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-04-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/fmii.12026\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fmii.12026\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Economics, Econometrics and Finance\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fmii.12026","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Economics, Econometrics and Finance","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

本文探讨了公司治理与信息不对称的关系。我们发现，鼓励对管理者进行监督的治理机制的代理与信息不对称的代理呈负相关。具体而言，更大的董事会独立性、董事会活跃度和债务融资与信息不对称程度呈显著负相关，这体现在买卖价差、股票收益波动性、正常化股票交易量和交易股票市值上。这意味着加强管理监督的公司治理机制会导致公司信息环境的改善。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Governance Quality and Information Asymmetry

This paper explores the relation between corporate governance and asymmetric information. We find that proxies for governance mechanisms that encourage the monitoring of managers are inversely related to proxies for asymmetric information. Specifically, greater board independence, board activeness and debt financing are significantly and inversely related to the degree of asymmetric information as reflected in bid-ask spreads, volatility of share returns, normalised share trade volumes and market value of shares traded. This implies that corporate governance mechanisms that enhance managerial monitoring lead to improvements in the informational environment of the firm.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments bridges the gap between the academic and professional finance communities. With contributions from leading academics, as well as practitioners from organizations such as the SEC and the Federal Reserve, the journal is equally relevant to both groups. Each issue is devoted to a single topic, which is examined in depth, and a special fifth issue is published annually highlighting the most significant developments in money and banking, derivative securities, corporate finance, and fixed-income securities.