PSN: Debt (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Subordinated Debt Under Bail-in Threat","authors":"Edoardo D. Martino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2902134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2902134","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to address the role of subordinated liabilities within the new resolution framework resulting from the post-crisis reforms. In particular, this study starts from the resolution intervention of four Italian banks in November 2015. The legal analysis of that resolution is complemented by an empirical analysis of the determinants of subordinated debt issuances for Italian banks. From this set of evidence is possible to infer the desirability of a well-functioning and dynamic market for subordinated debt. On the other hand, what clearly emerges is the incompatibility between such a market and the new regulatory framework as it is. Therefore, the paper, given the compelling arguments showing the inefficiency of a pure mandatory bail-in mechanism for subordinated debt, proposes to complement it with a contractual clause to bail-in subordinated creditors, tailored on coco bonds model, in order to enhance certainty amongst the contractual parties.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123822215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Democratic Accountability for Public Debt","authors":"J. Justice","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2913198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2913198","url":null,"abstract":"What does it mean for public financial managers to be professionally and democratically accountable in managing public debt? How do they accomplish (or fall short of) accountability? What are the results of their accountability (or lack thereof)? This paper develops an analytic framework for mapping the accountability space within which public financial managers work to reconcile diverse normative expectations as they exercise discretionary judgment and choice in the area of public-debt management specifically. An accountability framework offers the possibility of connecting previous literature's focus on micro-level decision making and social psychology on the one hand, and macro-level normative guidance offered by public-choice theorists and public-finance economists on the other hand, by focusing on the interactions of macro- and meso-level norms and expectations with micro-level decision processes, judgment and choice.The framework is meant to provide a structure for understanding in empirical settings how state and local government financial managers' professional, democratic, and other accountabilities interact with each other and with other expressed and implied expectations of relevant stakeholders. It is intended to serve as a basis for conducting empirical research to understand how actual debt-management decisions and behavior respond (or fail to respond) to those various norms, and with what results. An additional, normative goal is to contribute to the development of means by which public administrators can understand and manage the conflict between espoused public preferences for thrift and implied and acted-upon preferences for profligacy, by making decisions that accommodate, resolve, or transcend those dilemmas of accountability.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"235 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122099994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Financier State as an Alternative to The Developmental State: A Case Study of Infrastructure Asset Recycling in New South Wales, Australia","authors":"C. Nowacki, R. Levitt, Ashby H. B. Monk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2860264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2860264","url":null,"abstract":"As public debt rises, governments struggle to fund and finance new infrastructure. The past two decades have seen an increase in privatization of infrastructure assets and public private partnerships. However, alignment of interests between governments and private owners can be challenging. In addition, private investors’ appetite has so far been skewed toward existing assets, while development requires new infrastructure. The literature about the role of the state in development also warns about a failure of the private sector to fulfill governments’ development goals, and the need for a strong State to regulate the market in order to achieve development. A case study of the creation of a new coordination agency in New South Wales (NSW), Australia, offers a new perspective on how governments can lead development. Contrary to Evans’ model of Developmental Bureaucracy, NSW created an agency staffed by employees from the private sector. They also focused on making the best use of private interests to indirectly serve developmental goals, instead silencing private interests by means of a strong bureaucratic culture. The connections between public and private sectors are reminiscent of O’Riain’s Flexible State. However, this case transposes this theory to the strategic fields of private versus public sectors instead of local versus global. Finally, the power given to the coordinating agency is also crucial in this case, but we argue that government is an institution in Scott’s sense, and that normative and cultural-cognitive elements are also crucial in explaining the success of NSW in addition to regulative aspects identified in previous studies. This case study supports a new theory of developmental state which we call the “financier state”, in which Government uses the tools of global financial markets to achieve developmental goals. We describe “asset recycling” as one of such tools, successfully used by NSW to develop infrastructure.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133698069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Public Debt and Economic Growth: New Evidence of the Non-Linearity","authors":"C. Djiogap","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2865936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2865936","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to address the relationship between public debt and economic growth. The paper uses the PSTR model to a broad panel data set for 126 industrialized and developing countries over the period of 1964-2014. We divide the data set into four groups, namely, high income countries, upper-middle-income countries, lower middle-income and low-income countries. We have mainly addressed two aspects of this relationship: the threshold estimates for the whole sample, as well as for different sub-samples, and some country-specific characteristics that can possibly affect the degree of sensitivity between public debt and growth. Our first-stage findings confirmed those in the literature that hold that the public debt-growth relationship is nonlinear and our threshold estimates increase with the level of income.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"286 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116206318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Blind Side of Public Debt Spikes","authors":"Laura Jaramillo, Carlos Mulas Granados, E. Kimani","doi":"10.5089/9781475545043.001.A001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475545043.001.A001","url":null,"abstract":"What explains public debt spikes since the end of WWII? To answer this question, this paper identifies 179 debt spike episodes from 1945 to 2014 across advanced and developing countries. We find that debt spikes are not rare events and their probability increases with time. We then show that large public debt spikes are neither driven by high primary deficits nor by output declines but instead by sizable stock-flow adjustments (SFAs). We also find that SFAs are poorly forecasted, which can affect debt sustainability analyses, and are associated with a higher probability of suffering non-declining debt paths in the aftermath of public debt spikes.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"72 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114210877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Churchill's Pari Passu","authors":"Pablo Triana","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2846778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2846778","url":null,"abstract":"The conventional interpretation of the pari passu clause found in sovereign debt contracts depends on whether the claim is secured or unsecured. We are told that ratable payments pari passus would be reserved for secured debts only (the idea being that each creditor should get an equally proportional share of the collateral pie). Unsecured debt transactions should not make such a promise of payments equality, would go the argument, with the proper meaning of pari passu in such context being just a pledge not to legally subordinate among similarly-situated creditors. I have found a 1920s example of a pro-rata payments pari passu promise for unsecured sovereign debt. This high-profile case (a critical component of the crucial post-World War I intergovernmental debt restructuring negotiations) can be added to the ever growing list of samples of sovereign ratable payments pari passus that have been found out there. A veritable flood of ratability (both from ancient and current sources) that contrasts sharply with the current efforts by many leading academics, lawyers, policymakers, and financiers to have ratable payments erased from the sovereign debt land. The 1920s pari passu described here is relevant not only due to the unsecured nature of the debt (we had been told that such pari passu was not supposed to exist), but also because it allows us to muse about the presence of the clause in pure sovereign-on-sovereign debt transactions. We wonder: does sovereign-on-sovereign lending carry pari passu clauses? what kind of parity would sovereign creditors enjoy amongst themselves? should the meaning and interpretation of pari passu differ, just because of the differing nature of the lenders? While this last question is not definitively tackled, it seems clear that the 1920s pari passu (authored by none other than Winston Churchill) can provide us with important teachings about the mysterious two Latin words. Above all, and when combined with other similar evidence, the main conclusion may be that the chimerical unsecured ratable payments pari passu, the Unicorn, the Area 51, the Loch Ness Monster of the sovereign debt markets, may have been much more real than presumed.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124523939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"De Viti De Marco vs. Ricardo on Public Debt: Self Extinction or Default?","authors":"G. Eusepi, R. Wagner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2776984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2776984","url":null,"abstract":"The most prominent Italian theorist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Antonio de Viti de Marco, accepted David Ricardo’s proposition that an extraordinary tax and a public loan are equivalent. Despite this common point of analytical departure, their theories of public debt diverged sharply. In this divergence, moreover, lies a fundamental gulf between two distinct analytical schemes for connecting the micro and macro levels of analysis. Ricardo treated macro aggregates as analytical primitives, with individual action being induced from those aggregates. In sharp contrast, de Viti took individual variables as primitive, with aggregate conditions being induced from interaction among those individual variables. Within de Viti’s framework of a fully cooperative state, public debt would be self-extinguishing. De Viti also recognized that democracies were never exclusively cooperative, as continuing competition among elites striving for power would enable politically dominant groups to pass cost onto the remainder of society, thereby operating as a de facto form of default.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121943322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Political Economy of Municipal Amalgamation - Evidence of Common Pool Effects and Local Public Debt","authors":"Benedikt S. L. Fritz, Lars P. Feld","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2727112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2727112","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the political economy of after merger effects of the large scale municipal amalgamations in the German state of Baden-Wurttemberg in the early 1970s. By exploiting the huge variance in the amalgamation process in terms of number of participating municipalities, municipality size or amalgamation strategy we identify considerable common pool effects. Amalgamations can create a common pool, as the former independent municipalities have now access to more resources. Common pool exploitation is stronger the more municipalities participate and when municipalities amalgamate by annexation. Additionally, voter involvement is lower in amalgamated municipalities.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124548275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Religiosity and the Cost of Debt","authors":"Hanwen Chen, H. Huang, Gerald J. Lobo, Chong Wang","doi":"10.1016/J.JBANKFIN.2016.06.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JBANKFIN.2016.06.005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"119210653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Political-Ideological Circumstances and Local Authorities’ Debt: Evidence From Portuguese Municipalities","authors":"N. Ribeiro, Susana Jorge","doi":"10.5709/ce.1897-9254.164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5709/ce.1897-9254.164","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of this research is to analyze whether the political-ideological situation of municipalities affects their debt level, considering evidence from Portugal for the period 2004-2013. A static panel data model is applied, incorporating factors such as political ideology, political-electoral cycle, governance format, coincidence of the political parties between Local Executive and Local Assembly and coincidence of the political parties between the Local Executive and Central Government. An additional variable to control the effects of the economic crisis between 2008 and 2010 is also considered. Based on the assumptions of the public choice theory, findings show a statistically significant relationship for the political-electoral cycle, allowing the conclusion that, given the evidence from Portuguese municipalities, debt increases in election years. Nevertheless, this is the only factor in the political-ideological circumstances that was found to be relevant in its effect on local authorities’ debt levels. It is also clear that the financial crisis in the period 2008-2010 likewise had a positive impact.The paper contributes to the strengthening of the debate on the association between municipalities’ political circumstances and debt, namely, in regards to strategic (electoral) debt cycles in local government.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"291 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121829074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}