{"title":"Skilled Labor Hiring Constraints and Debt Maturity Structure","authors":"Guillermo Ramirez-Chiang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3770154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3770154","url":null,"abstract":"Exploiting a large drop in the legislative cap for the H-1B visa program announced in 2003 as an adverse shock to the skilled labor supply of innovation (Kerr and Lincoln (2010)) and a difference-in-differences framework, I document that innovative firms experience a significant increase in their fraction of shorter maturity debt after the shock. Further, I show that such increase is consistent with the fact that innovative firms face important labor adjustment costs and refinancing constraints after the cap drop. Overall, my paper highlights that skilled labor hiring constraints affect debt maturity structure.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127490773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Too Little, Too Late: Principles of Economics, Politics or the Law? The New Argentine International (External) Debt Restructuring Saga","authors":"A. Abreu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3678850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3678850","url":null,"abstract":"Argentina and its policymakers have managed the art of seductive economic crises, sovereign debt litigation, and international sovereign debt policy-making lobbying. Distressed debt hedge funds too.<br><br>This short paper analyzes a recent public Council of the Americas’ intervention of Argentina's Minister of Economy on the country’s 2020 international (external) sovereign debt restructuring. In his intervention, the Minister argued that this time around the restructuring is different due to a different debt structure. The Minister also stated his principle-based position for the restructuring.<br><br>The paper concludes that while the Minister's statements may hold at a macro level, at a micro level, Argentina's 2001 and 2020 restructurings converge on debt structure as defined by the Minister. On those terms, this time would not be that different. Preference and priority should also be not to do too little, too late. By analyzing key discourse of Argentina’s Minister of Economy, this paper contributes answers to two central and highly-argued questions on the country’s 2020 restructuring: Would this time be different? Would it be too little, too late?","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121153174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Collective Action Clauses Reexamined: Thank You Argentina","authors":"Mark Walker, Alice Chong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3666495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3666495","url":null,"abstract":"The back and forth negotiation of Argentina’s most recent efforts to restructure its sovereign debt has given rise to novel issues of interpretation and use of collective action clauses (CACs), accompanied by charges and countercharges of abuse by Argentina of this important addition to the international financial architecture, on the one hand, and an alleged desire on the creditor side to walk back advances in the orderly restructuring of sovereign debt for narrow reasons of self-interest. Beneath the noise, however, there are important, previously unexamined issues of the policies underlying CACs and a need to improve the drafting of these clauses in order to ensure that they in fact further the policies that inspired them.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"9 26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122093958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Borrowing to Keep Up (With the Joneses): Inequality, Debt, and Conspicuous Consumption","authors":"Sheheryar Banuri, Ha Nguyen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3721084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3721084","url":null,"abstract":"The quest for status is a powerful motivator, but does it affect inequality? This paper presents a novel lab experiment that was designed and conducted to identify the relationship between inequality, status signaling, debt, and conspicuous consumption. It reports three main findings: First, consumption increases when it is\"conspicuous\"(i.e. is both observable, and signals ability/status). Second, borrowing increases when consumption is conspicuous. More critically, this increase in loan-taking is driven by those at the bottom of the income distribution. Third, in the presence of conspicuous consumption, access to finance exacerbates inequality. The results point to a vicious cycle of inequality and costly borrowing.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121428540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pablo Burriel, Cristina D. Checherita-Westphal, P. Jacquinot, Matthias Schonlau, Nikolai Stahler
{"title":"Economic Consequences of High Public Debt: Evidence from Three Large Scale DSGE Models","authors":"Pablo Burriel, Cristina D. Checherita-Westphal, P. Jacquinot, Matthias Schonlau, Nikolai Stahler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3676264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3676264","url":null,"abstract":"The paper reviews the economic risks associated with regimes of high public debt through DSGE model simulations. The large public debt build-up following the 2009 global financial and economic crisis acted as a shock absorber for output, while in the recent and more severe COVID19-crisis, an increase in public debt is even more justified given the nature of the crisis. Yet, once the crisis is over and the recovery firmly sets in, keeping debt at high levels over the medium term is a source of vulnerability in itself. Moreover, in the euro area, where monetary policy focuses on the area-wide aggregate, countries with high levels of indebtedness are poorly equipped to withstand future asymmetric shocks. Using three large scale DSGE models, the simulation results suggest that high-debt economies (1) can lose more output in a crisis, (2) may spend more time at the zero-lower bound, (3) are more heavily affected by spillover effects, (4) face a crowding out of private debt in the short and long run, (5) have less scope for counter-cyclical fiscal policy and (6) are adversely affected in terms of potential (long-term) output, with a significant impairment in case of large sovereign risk premia reaction and use of most distortionary type of taxation to finance the additional debt burden in the future. Going forward, reforms at national level, together with currently planned reforms at the EU level, need to be timely implemented to ensure both risk reduction and risk sharing and to enable high debt economies address their vulnerabilities. JEL Classification: E62, H63, O40, E43","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125537201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Government Consumption, Government Debt and Economic Growth","authors":"Shahrzad Ghourchian, H. Yilmazkuday","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2822396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2822396","url":null,"abstract":"This paper compares the effects of government consumption and government debt on economic growth by using data from 83 countries, including both developed and developing markets, over the period between 1960 and 2014. Linear regressions reveal that the negative effects of government consumption are relatively higher than the negative effects of government debt. A nonlinear investigation further suggests that the restrictions on government expenditure to prevent negative growth are shown to be more important for countries with lower trade openness, lower inflation, or higher financial depth, whereas the restrictions on government debt are shown to be more important for countries with higher trade openness, lower inflation or higher financial depth.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123948233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Barbados Sovereign Debt Restructuring 2018-19 -- Like The Island, Small But Perfectly Formed","authors":"Andrew Shutter","doi":"10.1093/cmlj/kmaa006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cmlj/kmaa006","url":null,"abstract":"The Caribbean is no stranger to sovereign debt restructurings. It is hard to imagine another region of the world with a higher ratio of GDRs per capita. In only the last ten years (a blink of an eye in sovereign debt years), each of Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Grenada and St Kitts and Nevis have undergone debt restructurings and Jamaica has done so twice. \u0000 \u0000So what is newsworthy about the debt restructuring just completed by Barbados? There are two significant “firsts”, as will be described in more detail in this article: \u0000 \u0000- first use in the Caribbean of local law legislation to introduce a class voting system across exiting local law sovereign bonds, a la Greece ; and \u0000 \u0000- first country to take advantage of a re-papering of the terms of its domestic and foreign sovereign debt to include a “natural disaster” clause to enable the deferral of debt service costs in the event of significant damage caused by a natural disaster. \u0000 \u0000Barbados is, economically, in a relatively privileged position within the Caribbean. Its GDP per capita is in the same IMF bracket as Portugal and Mexico and three and four times than the GDP per capital of Dominica and Jamaica, respectively . Geographically too, Barbados is in a relatively privileged position. It stands out on its own, about 150kms east of the crescent of islands that make up the Windward Islands and Leeward Islands, known collectively as the Lesser Antilles. It’s latitude makes it one of the more southerly of the Lesser Antilles, which is believed to make the island less at risk of hurricane damage than more northerly islands. \u0000 \u0000However, Barbados’ privileged position made it particularly vulnerable to the financial storm that followed the global financial crisis. As a service provider of higher end Caribbean vacations, Barbados was particularly impacted by the downturn in vacation spending by those in the UK, US and Europe whose disposable income had been constrained by the financial crisis. As one of the wealthier countries in the Caribbean, international private creditors had been keen to provide loans and buys bonds issued by Barbados in the boom years leading up to the financial crisis. Even before the fall in GDP per capita that coincided with the financial crisis, the debt to GDP of Barbados had been rising precipitously from 53.8% in 1999 to 100% in 2009. By the time prime minister Mia Mottley swept into government following a landslide election victory in May 2018 (in which her party won all 30 seats in the Barbados parliament), the island’s debt to GDP had reached 175% including arrears. With characteristic decisiveness, immediately on entering office Ms Mottley announced that there would be a restructuring of the country’s debts.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133430254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
W. Koh, M. Kose, P. Nagle, F. Ohnsorge, Naotaka Sugawara
{"title":"Debt and Financial Crises","authors":"W. Koh, M. Kose, P. Nagle, F. Ohnsorge, Naotaka Sugawara","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3535970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3535970","url":null,"abstract":"Emerging market and developing economies have experienced recurrent episodes of rapid debt accumulation over the past fifty years. This paper examines the consequences of debt accumulation using a three-pronged approach: an event study of debt accumulation episodes in 100 emerging market and developing economies since 1970; a series of econometric models examining the linkages between debt and the probability of financial crises; and a set of case studies of rapid debt buildup that ended in crises. The paper reports four main results. First, episodes of debt accumulation are common, with more than 500 episodes occurring since 1970. Second, around half of these episodes were associated with financial crises which typically had worse economic outcomes than those without crises -- after 8 years output per capita was typically 6-10 percent lower and investment 15-22 percent weaker in crisis episodes. Third, a rapid buildup of debt, whether public or private, increased the likelihood of a financial crisis, as did a larger share of short-term external debt, higher debt service cover, and lower reserves cover. Fourth, countries that experienced financial crises frequently employed combinations of unsustainable fiscal, monetary and financial sector policies, and often suffered from structural and institutional weaknesses.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"125 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122451591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
PSN: Debt (Topic)Pub Date : 2019-10-01DOI: 10.5089/9781513512952.001
R. Bouis
{"title":"Banks' Holdings of Government Securities and Credit to the Private Sector in Emerging Market and Developing Economies","authors":"R. Bouis","doi":"10.5089/9781513512952.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513512952.001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the relationship between banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign securities and credit growth to the private sector in emerging market and developing economies. Higher banks’ holdings of government debt are associated with a lower credit growth to the private sector and with a higher return on assets of the banking sector. Analysis suggests that the negative relationship between banks’ claims on the government and private sector credit growth mainly reflects a portfolio rebalancing of banks towards safer, more liquid public assets in stress times and provides only limited evidence of a crowding-out effect due to financial repression.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114606005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Private Placements and the Cost of Borrowing in the Municipal Debt Market","authors":"Tima T. Moldogaziev, R. Greer, Jekyung Lee","doi":"10.1111/pbaf.12235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12235","url":null,"abstract":"Private placements continue to be issued in the municipal debt market and remain a topic of interest for municipalities, investors, and regulators. Private placements are often sold without an underwriter to relatively sophisticated investors and are typically “buy‐to‐hold” transactions. Therefore, compared with traditional competitive or negotiated sales, there are fewer financial intermediaries and fewer regulatory disclosure requirements that accompany private placements. Savings on “flotation” costs can be substantial enough to make private placements a less costly method of debt offering. Conditional on selectivity in the method of sale and key market covariates, private placements offer lower arbitrage yields and issuance costs compared to both competitive and negotiated debt offerings.","PeriodicalId":376458,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Debt (Topic)","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126155866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}