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PSN: Game Theory (Topic)最新文献

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Innovation in a Generalized Timing Game 广义定时博弈中的创新
PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-08-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2314722
V. Smirnov, A. Wait
{"title":"Innovation in a Generalized Timing Game","authors":"V. Smirnov, A. Wait","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2314722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2314722","url":null,"abstract":"We examine innovation as a market-entry timing game with complete information and observable actions. We characterize all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria for the two-player symmetric model allowing both the leader’s and the follower’s payoff functions to be multi-peaked, non-monotonic and discontinuous. We provide sufficient conditions for when the equilibria can be Pareto-ranked and when the equilibrium is unique. Economic applications discussed include process and product innovation and the timing of the sale of an asset.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122913688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Using Prisoner's Dilemma to Evaluate Corporate Tax Reform Proposals 用囚徒困境评价公司税改革建议
PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2303950
Toby Rogers
{"title":"Using Prisoner's Dilemma to Evaluate Corporate Tax Reform Proposals","authors":"Toby Rogers","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2303950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2303950","url":null,"abstract":"The game Prisoner’s Dilemma provides a helpful tool for understanding international tax competition. Nations would be best served by cooperating with each other to keep corporate income tax rates high. But fearing defection by other nations, many nations often unilaterally lower their corporate income tax rates. In the process they shift the tax burden onto labor and consumers which increases inequality, erodes democracy, decreases consumer demand, and can lead to recessions. International coordination and upward harmonization of corporate tax rates is the optimal solution to the problems caused by international tax competition. Applying the lessons of game theory to several leading corporate tax reform proposals shows that lowering the top statutory corporate tax rate, a repatriation holiday, integration of the personal and corporate income tax, and Representative Dave Camp's proposed shift to a territorial system of corporate taxation would all speed the race to the bottom. But a minimum tax on foreign earnings or a sales-only version of formulary apportionment could potentially halt the race to the bottom.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128854134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reputations in Repeated Games 重复游戏中的声誉
PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-06-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2286763
G. Mailath, L. Samuelson
{"title":"Reputations in Repeated Games","authors":"G. Mailath, L. Samuelson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2286763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2286763","url":null,"abstract":"This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134614972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 31
The Constraining, Liberating, and Informational Effects of Non-Binding Law 非约束性法律的约束、解放与信息效应
PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-06-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2291723
J. Fox, M. Stephenson
{"title":"The Constraining, Liberating, and Informational Effects of Non-Binding Law","authors":"J. Fox, M. Stephenson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2291723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2291723","url":null,"abstract":"We show that nonbinding law can have a constraining effect on political leaders, because legal compliance is a costly signal to imperfectly informed voters that the leader is unbiased. Moreover, nonbinding law can also have a liberating effect, enabling some leaders to take action when they otherwise would have done nothing. In addition, we illustrate how voters may face a trade-off between the legal standard that induces optimal behavior of the current leader (i.e., that most effectively addresses the moral hazard problem) and the legal standard that optimizes selection of future leaders (i.e., that most effectively addresses the adverse selection problem). We discuss a range of positive and normative implications that follow from our analysis. (JEL D72, K40).","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133074279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Best-Reply Dynamic in Large Aggregative Games 大型聚合博弈中的最佳回复动态
PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-01-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2210080
Y. Babichenko
{"title":"Best-Reply Dynamic in Large Aggregative Games","authors":"Y. Babichenko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2210080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2210080","url":null,"abstract":"We consider small-influence aggregative games with a large number of players n. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most cn log n steps for some constant c>0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least 1-e-c'n for some constant c'>0.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126148806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 吵闹重复游戏中的个体学习与合作
PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-11-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2177923
Y. Yamamoto
{"title":"Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games","authors":"Y. Yamamoto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2177923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2177923","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions and/or the monitoring structure. Each player privately learns the state over time but cannot observe what the opponent learned. We show that there are robust equilibria in which players eventually obtain payoffs as if the true state were common knowledge and players played a \"belief-free\" equilibrium. We also provide explicit equilibrium constructions in various economic examples. Copyright 2014, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"267 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116831545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15
Provision of a Public Good with Altruistic Overlapping Generations and Many Tribes 具有利他重叠代和多部落的公共产品的提供
PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-07-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2298180
L. Karp
{"title":"Provision of a Public Good with Altruistic Overlapping Generations and Many Tribes","authors":"L. Karp","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2298180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2298180","url":null,"abstract":"Intergenerational altruism and contemporaneous cooperation are both important to the provision of long-lived public goods. Equilibrium climate protection may depend more sensitively on either of these considerations, depending on the type of policy rule one examines. This conclusion is based on a model with n tribes, each with a sequence of overlapping generations. Tribal members discount their and their descendants’ utility at different rates. Agents in the resulting game are indexed by tribal affiliation and the time at which they act. The Markov Perfect equilibrium is found by solving a control problem with a constant discount rate and an endogenous annuity.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129091761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20
Two Player Decision Behaviors Changing in Repeated Game 重复游戏中两名玩家决策行为的变化
PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-06-01 DOI: 10.18311/GJEIS/2012/3172
P. Mittal, K. Sharma
{"title":"Two Player Decision Behaviors Changing in Repeated Game","authors":"P. Mittal, K. Sharma","doi":"10.18311/GJEIS/2012/3172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18311/GJEIS/2012/3172","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies Stackelberg model in repeated game with the learning attitude of the follower and leader-follower. Leader player (firm-A) and follower player (firm-B) produce the homogeneous good in initial period. Follower does not want to be a follower always, but want to work with equal profit gainer at least. In finite periods play, both firms tent to produce the homogeneous good as per Cournot Game due to having leader-firm's farsightedness in production of good. Both the Firms collude and produce less than Nash-Cournot equilibrium to maximize its profit in each period.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126248787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information 不完全信息下最后通牒博弈的价值
PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-04-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2312320
Damien Besancenot, D. Dubart, R. Vranceanu
{"title":"The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information","authors":"Damien Besancenot, D. Dubart, R. Vranceanu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2312320","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312320","url":null,"abstract":"Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about their endowment. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that the rest of them are likely to declare a lower-than-actual endowment to the responders. In the second part of the paper, we report on an experiment testing this game. On average, 88.5% of the proposers understate the actual endowment by 20.5%. Regression analysis shows that a one-dollar gap between the actual and declared amounts prompts proposers to reduce their offer by 19 cents. However, responders appear not to take such claims seriously, and thus the frequency of rejections should increase. The consequence is a net welfare loss, that is specific to such a \"free-to-lie\" environment.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128204054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 28
Best-Reply Dynamics in Large Anonymous Games 大型匿名游戏中的最佳回复动态
PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-03-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2028522
Y. Babichenko
{"title":"Best-Reply Dynamics in Large Anonymous Games","authors":"Y. Babichenko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2028522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2028522","url":null,"abstract":"We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players $n$ where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most $cn log n$ steps for some constant $c>0$). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least $1-e^{-c'n}$ for some constant $c'>0$.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116827443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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