{"title":"Unit vs. Ad Valorem Taxes under Revenue Maximization","authors":"Germain Gaudin, A. White","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2440708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2440708","url":null,"abstract":"We compare unit and ad valorem commodity tax regimes under the \"Leviathan hypothesis\" that the government seeks to maximize tax revenue. We show that the ad valorem tax regime welfare-dominates the unit tax regime if and only if the economy exhibits \"ad valorem under-shifting\" in response to a change in the tax level. Under Cournot competition, the level of shifting depends entirely on whether demand is not too convex so that elasticity of demand is increasing in price. In a more general framework, with differentiated goods, the threshold level of convexity such that unit taxes welfare dominate ad valorem ones can be lower.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124786512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fiscal Federalism and Competitive Bidding for Foreign Investment as a Multistage Game","authors":"R. Jha, H. Nagarajan, Kolumum R. Nagarajan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2466846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2466846","url":null,"abstract":"This paper models the behavior of states in a federal country wising to attract foreign firms to locate within their own individual jurisdictions. The essential intertemporal character of this decision is modeled as a multi-stage game to attract such foreign investment in these states. It is found that, when states with unequal political or economic infrastructure compete, the resulting Nash equilibrium profiles are inefficient. Under certain conditions, states that have won once, can “allow” a rival to win in a subsequent stage. The resulting Nash Equilibrium is more efficient. If the option of “allowing” a rival to win is not available, then states may resort to “suicide” strategies defined as outcomes created by history of losses.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"53 81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132058076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mixed Equilibrium in a Pure Location Game: The Case of N ≥ 4 Firms","authors":"Christian Ewerhart","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2470476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2470476","url":null,"abstract":"The Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory, and professional forecasting. In this paper, the doubly symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for n ≥ 4 firms is characterized as the solution of a well-behaved boundary value problem. The analysis suggests that, in contrast to the cases n = 3 and n → ∞ , the equilibrium for a finite number of n ≥ 4 firms tends to overrepresent locations at the periphery of its support interval. Moreover, in the class of examples considered, an increase in the number of firms universally leads to a wider range of location choices and to a more dispersed distribution of individual locations. The results are used to comment on the potential benefit of competition in forecasting markets.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134640984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Weakly Monotonic Solutions for Cooperative Games","authors":"André Casajus, Frank Huettner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2417178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2417178","url":null,"abstract":"The principle of weak monotonicity for cooperative games states that if a game changes so that the worth of the grand coalition and some player's marginal contribution to all coalitions increase or stay the same, then this player's payoff should not decrease. We investigate the class of values that satisfy efficiency, symmetry, and weak monotonicity. It turns out that this class coincides with the class of egalitarian Shapley values. Thus, weak monotonicity reflects the nature of the egalitarian Shapley values in the same vein as strong monotonicity reflects the nature of the Shapley value. An egalitarian Shapley value redistributes the Shapley payoffs as follows: First, the Shapley payoffs are taxed proportionally at a fixed rate. Second, the total tax revenue is distributed equally among all players.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114633837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hot Spot Policing: A Study of Place-Based Strategies to Crime Prevention","authors":"Natalia Lazzati, A. Menichini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2277876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2277876","url":null,"abstract":"Hot spot policing is a popular policing strategy that addresses crime by assigning limited police resources to areas where crimes are more highly concentrated. We analyze this strategy using a game theoretic approach. The main argument against focusing police resources on hot spots is that it would simply displace criminal activity from one area to another. We provide new insights on the nature of the displacement effect with useful implications for the empirical analysis of crime-reduction effects of police reallocation. We also propose alternative place-based policies that display attractive properties in terms of geographic spillovers of crime reduction via optimal police reallocation.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"55 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132845747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Classes of Complete Simple Games that are All Weighted","authors":"Sascha Kurz, Nikolas Tautenhahn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2375609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2375609","url":null,"abstract":"Important decisions are likely made by groups of agents. Thus group decision making is very common in practice. Very transparent group aggregating rules are given by weighted voting, where each agent is assigned a weight. Here a proposal is accepted if the sum of the weights of the supporting agents meets or exceeds a given quota. We study a more general class of binary voting systems -- complete simple games -- and propose an algorithm to determine which sub classes, parameterized by the agent's type composition, are weighted.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"37 12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122625420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Zero Sum Games, Linear Programming and Kuhn-Tucker Theory","authors":"D. Glycopantis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2374311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2374311","url":null,"abstract":"The paper explains by means of two detailed examples that Nash Equilibria in zero-sum games can be obtained through the application of linear programming and maximin calculations. It also discusses, for the same purpose, the application of Kuhn-Tucker theory. In particular, with respect to the economic interpretation of the primal and dual problems, it established the equilibrium condition \"Marginal Cost greater or equal to Marginal Revenue'' also for the use of strategies. It thus obtains the analogue of the equilibrium condition for the use of activities in the conventional economic problem.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127373863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jon X. Eguia, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, R. Morton, Antonio Nicoló
{"title":"Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information","authors":"Jon X. Eguia, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, R. Morton, Antonio Nicoló","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2414500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2414500","url":null,"abstract":"Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes no restrictions on beliefs: we select the action profile that is supported in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs. We conduct experiments to test the predictive power of the existing and our novel selection criteria in two applications: a game of vertical multi-lateral contracting, and a game of electoral competition. We find that our selection criterion outperforms the other selection criteria.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127023364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quantal Response Methods for Equilibrium Selection in Normal Form Games","authors":"Boyu Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2375553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2375553","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes a general framework for equilibrium selection by tracing the graph of the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) correspondence as a function of the variance of random disturbances. If a quantal response function satisfies C2 continuity, monotonicity and cumulativity, the graph of QRE correspondence generically includes a unique branch that starts at the centroid of the strategy simplex and converges to a unique Nash equilibrium as noises vanish. This equilibrium is called the limiting QRE of the game. We then investigate the limiting QRE in normal form games, and analyze the effects of payoff transformations and adding/eliminating dominated strategies on equilibrium selection. We find that in two-person symmetric games, any strict Nash equilibrium can be selected as the limiting QRE by appropriately adding a single strictly dominated strategy.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133159732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version","authors":"G. Mailath, L. Samuelson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2308937","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2308937","url":null,"abstract":"This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"138 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124339847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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