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CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors (Topic)最新文献

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Executive Compensation and Risk Taking in European Banking 欧洲银行业高管薪酬与风险承担
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-08-03 DOI: 10.4337/9781849806107.00018
R. Ayadi, E. Arbak, Willem Pieter De Groen
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引用次数: 8
Public vs Private Ownership, Board Structure and Fund Manager Turnover 公有与私有所有权，董事会结构和基金经理更替
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-04-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1492846
John C. Adams, S. Mansi, Takeshi Nishikawa
{"title":"Public vs Private Ownership, Board Structure and Fund Manager Turnover","authors":"John C. Adams, S. Mansi, Takeshi Nishikawa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1492846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1492846","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the relation between organizational structure (public vs private) and managerial turnover in a large sample of U.S. offered mutual funds. Consistent with the hypothesis that publicly traded firms focus more on shorter term performance, we find that public sponsors are more sensitive to prior fund performance when making replacement decisions and experience smaller post turnover performance improvements. Additional testing suggests a higher likelihood of fund manager replacement when mutual funds are team managed and when fund boards more independent. Overall, our results indicate that organizational form plays a pivotal role in the managerial labor market for mutual funds.","PeriodicalId":373523,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129879300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Giving a Shareholders a Say on Pay: A Measure Leading to Better Governance 给予股东薪酬话语权:一项改善治理的措施
CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-03-08 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1580071
Yvan Allaire
{"title":"Giving a Shareholders a Say on Pay: A Measure Leading to Better Governance","authors":"Yvan Allaire","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1580071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1580071","url":null,"abstract":"The arguments pros and cons a non-binding vote by shareholders on executive compensation do not readily tip the balance in one direction or the other. The sense of unfairness and the frustration with some patent cases of excessive compensation have generated a good deal of sympathy for more direct and vigorous measures to curb extravagant compensation practices. Nevertheless, boards of directors fully responsible and accountable for the governance of publicly traded corporations do form the cornerstone of our system of corporate governance.","PeriodicalId":373523,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129193539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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