{"title":"Non-Evidentialist Epistemology: Introduction and Overview","authors":"N. J. Pedersen, Luca Moretti","doi":"10.1163/9789004465534_002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004465534_002","url":null,"abstract":"1. Evidentialism and non-evidentialism The aim of this edited collection is to explore non-evidentialist epistemology or nonevidentialism—roughly, the view that evidence is not required in order for a doxastic attitude to have a positive epistemic standing. According to this view, it is possible for belief or acceptance to be epistemically justified, warranted, or rational in the absence of supporting evidence. To introduce non-evidentialist epistemology it is helpful to take a look at the contrasting view, evidentialism. William K. Clifford is well-known—or infamous—for espousing the thesis that it is always wrong to believe on insufficient evidence.1 This thesis is often referred to as ‘Clifford’s Thesis’ or ‘Clifford’s Principle’. The thesis, as intended by Clifford, applies universally along several dimensions: for anyone, at any given time, and at any given place. The relevant kind of wrongness has been interpreted as both prudential and ethical. In this sense, evidence underwrites a prudential and ethical norm of belief.2 Evidentialism is a very prominent view in contemporary epistemology. Epistemic evidentialists draw inspiration from Clifford by endorsing an evidential norm for doxastic attitudes. However, unlike Clifford, evidentialists take evidence to underwrite an epistemic norm of belief. Their key commitment is thus the principle of epistemic evidentialism:","PeriodicalId":355407,"journal":{"name":"Non-Evidentialist Epistemology","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128515443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Problems for Wright’s Entitlement Theory","authors":"Luca Moretti","doi":"10.1163/9789004465534_007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004465534_007","url":null,"abstract":"Crispin Wright’s entitlement theory holds that we have non-evidential justification for accepting propositions of a general type––which Wright calls “cornerstones”––that enables us to acquire justification for believing other propositions––those that we take to be true on the grounds of ordinary evidence. Entitlement theory is meant by Wright to deliver a forceful response to the sceptic who argues that we cannot justify ordinary beliefs. I initially focus on strategic entitlement, which is one of the types of entitlement that Wright has described in more detail. I suggest that it is dubious that we are strategically entitled to accept cornerstones. After this, I focus on entitlement in general. I contend that, in important cases, non-evidential justification for accepting cornerstones cannot secure evidential justification for believing ordinary propositions. My argument rests on a probabilistic regimentation of the so-called “leaching problem”.","PeriodicalId":355407,"journal":{"name":"Non-Evidentialist Epistemology","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125375216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inescapable Hinges: A Transcendental Hinge Epistemology","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/9789004465534_003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004465534_003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":355407,"journal":{"name":"Non-Evidentialist Epistemology","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123983109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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