Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures最新文献

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Wittgenstein on Certainty 维特根斯坦论确定性
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1973-03-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-15546-0_14
A. Ayer
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引用次数: 1
Wittgenstein's Theory of Knowledge 维特根斯坦的知识论
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1973-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600000376
C. Coope
{"title":"Wittgenstein's Theory of Knowledge","authors":"C. Coope","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600000376","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600000376","url":null,"abstract":"I shall start by considering the apparently paradoxical doctrines that Wittgenstein put forward about knowledge: they show how the concept of knowledge is, as he says, ‘specialized’. This is not, as I shall show, a very important issue in itself, but it leads on to other points, of more interest: how it comes about, for example, that ‘not all corrections of our beliefs are on the same level’. I shall then discuss the idea that we inherit a certain picture of the world that forms the background of our experiments and researches. This idea, which is not of course unique to Wittgenstein, is, however, developed with many fresh insights. I end with some discussion of Wittgenstein's reported views on religious belief, which should not, in my opinion, be regarded as part of his contribution to philosophy, the interest of them being, perhaps, more biographical than philosophical.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1973-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124868953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Wittgenstein on the Soul 维特根斯坦论灵魂
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1973-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600000339
I. Dilman
{"title":"Wittgenstein on the Soul","authors":"I. Dilman","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600000339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600000339","url":null,"abstract":"It is sometimes said that a human being has a soul, whereas animals and lifeless things do not. The distinction made is of significance probably for most religions. Although it sets man apart and places him in a unique category, it should not be taken to imply that there is no difference between what is alive and has sentience, apart from man, and what is lifeless and unconscious. This was Descartes' error. For he ran together several distinctions and equated the soul with consciousness.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1973-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123507395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, and Ethics 维特根斯坦、叔本华与伦理学
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1973-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600000297
A. Griffiths
{"title":"Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, and Ethics","authors":"A. Griffiths","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600000297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600000297","url":null,"abstract":"Wittgenstein always thought that he had not been understood, and indeed that it was very unlikely that many people ever would understand him. Russell not only failed to understand Wittgenstein's later work; according to Wittgenstein himself, Russell profoundly failed to understand even the Tractatus. Professor Anscombe says even she did not understand him, and that to attempt to give an account of what he says is only to express one's own ordinariness or mediocrity or lack of complexity. Certainly, most people acquainted with the Tractatus, when that work was Wittgenstein's only published book, gave it what now seems a quite crass positivistic interpretation. Wittgenstein's own preface to the Tractatus, despite its last sentence, does not help. He does tell us that the whole sense of the work is that what can be said can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must consign to silence: but this does not make it clear that what we cannot talk about is all that is really important. Even when one has realised all this, however, one is aware mostly of one's failure to understand; and that if one did get any distance in understanding the last sixth of the Tractatus, the process would be extremely difficult, and the results quite astonishing.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1973-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125588071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Questions on Logical Inference 关于逻辑推理的问题
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1973-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S008044360000025X
R. Rhees
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引用次数: 1
Can whether one proposition makes sense depend on the truth of another? (Tractatus 2.0211—2) 一个命题是否有意义取决于另一个命题的真实性?(Tractatus 2.0211 2)
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1973-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600000248
R. M. White
{"title":"Can whether one proposition makes sense depend on the truth of another? (Tractatus 2.0211—2)","authors":"R. M. White","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600000248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600000248","url":null,"abstract":"Wittgenstein's Tractatus contains a wide range of profound insights into the nature of logic and language – insights which will survive the particular theories of the Tractatus and seem to me to mark definitive and unassailable landmarks in our understanding of some of the deepest questions of philosophy. And yet alongside these insights there is a theory of the nature of the relation between language and reality which appears both to be impossible to work out in detail in a way which is completely satisfactory, and to be bizarre and incredible. I am referring to the so-called logical atomism of the Tractatus. The main outlines of this theory at least are clear and familiar: there are elementary propositions which gain their sense from being models of possible states of affairs; such propositions are configurations of names of simple objects, signifying that those simples are analogously configured; every proposition has its sense through being analysable as a truth-functional compound of elementary propositions, thus deriving its sense from the sense of the elementary propositions when this view is taken in conjunction with the idea that the sense of a proposition is completely specified by specifying its truth-conditions. In this way the Tractatus incorporates in its working out a philosophical system analogous to the classical philosophical systems of Leibniz or Spinoza which are regarded by many people, in a sense rightly, as the prehistoric monsters of philosophy which are not to be studied as living organisms, but studied as the curiosities of human thought. And we may here agree that in the end we must simply reject a philosophy which incorporates such features as its postulation of simple eternal objects, or of a possibility of an analysis of a proposition which was presented as a pre-condition for the propositions that we ordinarily utter to make sense, and yet the specific form of which we are unaware of, and so on.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1973-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124660556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
How to read Wittgenstein 如何解读维特根斯坦
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1973-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/1467-9205.00040
J. W. Cook
{"title":"How to read Wittgenstein","authors":"J. W. Cook","doi":"10.1111/1467-9205.00040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9205.00040","url":null,"abstract":"In the Michaelmas Term 1968 I gave a course of lectures on the Philosophical Investigations. Until then nobody had lectured at Cambridge specifically on that book, though it had been in print for fifteen years and must by that time have been lectured on in nearly every other philosophy department in the English-speaking world. One reason why we were so slow is suggested by a remark that John Wisdom made after hearing Max Black give a lecture on the Tractatus in the early fifties. As we came out of the lecture room he said to me ‘That was a strange experience. I have a clear memory of all that from my early years in Cambridge. And yet in some ways it was like hearing a lecture on Spinoza.’","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1973-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121736141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 48
The Ghost of the Tractatus 特拉塔图斯的幽灵
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1973-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600000236
A. Kenny
{"title":"The Ghost of the Tractatus","authors":"A. Kenny","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600000236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600000236","url":null,"abstract":"Wittgenstein was unreliable as an historian of philosophy. When he criticised other philosophers he rarely gave chapter and verse for his criticism, and on the rare occasions on which he quoted verbatim he did not always do justice to the authors quoted. I will illustrate this first in the comparatively unimportant case of Augustine and then in the more serious case of Frege.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1973-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123954646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Silent Soliloquy 沉默的独白
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1973-03-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-15546-0_13
R. Squires
{"title":"Silent Soliloquy","authors":"R. Squires","doi":"10.1007/978-1-349-15546-0_13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15546-0_13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1973-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130804380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Wittgenstein on Russell's Theory of Judgment 维特根斯坦论罗素的判断论
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1973-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600000273
Guy Stock
{"title":"Wittgenstein on Russell's Theory of Judgment","authors":"Guy Stock","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600000273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600000273","url":null,"abstract":"In the early years of this century the debate as to the nature of judgment was a central issue dividing British philosophers. What a philosopher said about judgment was not independent of what he said about perception, the distinction between the a priori and empirical, the distinction between external and internal relations, the nature of inference, truth, universals, language, the reality of the self and so on.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1973-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116373976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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