Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures最新文献

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Hume's Impressions 休谟的印象
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1975-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600001035
R. J. Butler
{"title":"Hume's Impressions","authors":"R. J. Butler","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600001035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600001035","url":null,"abstract":"It is a pleasure to read Hume, and to watch him explore recalcitrant problems with agility of mind and grace of style. Ironically these twin abilities have worked against each other from the beginning, in the first place because in the matter of writing Hume was an innovator — nobody before him had so successfully albeit unwittingly adapted French syntax to the writing of English-and-Scottish - and in the second place because on the grace of his style subtleties of thought flow past his readers, who then accuse him of obscurity. So abstruse were his writings to his contemporaries that he failed to achieve the literary recognition for which he craved; and even today, long after the elegance of his style has been received, it is said by Passmore that Hume in contrast to Berkeley ‘was a philosophical puppy-dog, picking up and worrying one problem after another, always leaving his teeth-marks in it, but casting it aside when it threatened to become wearisome.’ Similarly Selby-Bigge says in his introduction to the Enquiries: His pages, especially those of the Treatise, are so full of matter, he says so many things in so many different ways and different connexions, and with so much indifference to what he has said before, that it is very hard to say positively that he taught, or did not teach, this or that particular doctrine. He applies the same principles to such a great variety of subjects that it is not surprising that many verbal, and some real inconsistencies can be found in his statements. He is ambitious rather than shy of saying the same thing in different ways, and at the same time he is often slovenly and indifferent about his words and formulae. This makes it easy to find all philosophies in Hume, or, by setting up one statement against another, none at all.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1975-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115750924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
The Status of Sense Data 传感数据的状态
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1975-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S008044360000100X
D. O'connor
{"title":"The Status of Sense Data","authors":"D. O'connor","doi":"10.1017/S008044360000100X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S008044360000100X","url":null,"abstract":"In the present state of philosophy in the English-speaking world, to choose to talk about sense data may seem perverse. What could be more boring for one's audience than to attempt variations on so threadbare a theme? And worse, what could be more unfashionable in the aftermath of Wittgenstein and Austin? My reasons for selecting this unpromising topic are twofold. First, the general theme of this series of lectures is empiricism. And whatever meanings we put upon that ambiguous word, it is clear that as a matter of history the problems of perception have been important problems for nearly all those philosophers who would consider themselves to be empiricists. And however unsatisfactory sense datum theories of perception may now be held to be, such theories have been central to the empiricist tradition. Secondly, it is important not to be too much impressed by the fact that a particular philosophical opinion is fashionable or unfashionable. The former certainly does not guarantee its truth nor the latter its falsity. It has often been remarked that philosophical opinions are very rarely refuted. Instead they fall out of vogue only to return some years later in another guise. It is perhaps time to take another look at the notion of sense data. The most ingenious and persistent attacks on analyses of perception in terms of sense data have been at best indecisive, as Professor Ayer showed in his reply to Austin's Sense and Sensibilia.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1975-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116743863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
Memory as Direct Awareness of the Past 记忆是对过去的直接意识
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1975-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600000960
N. Malcolm
{"title":"Memory as Direct Awareness of the Past","authors":"N. Malcolm","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600000960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600000960","url":null,"abstract":"The philosophy of memory has been largely dominated by what could be called ‘the representative theory of memory’. In trying to give an account of ‘what goes on in one's mind’ when one remembers something, or of what ‘the mental content of remembering’ consists, philosophers have usually insisted that there must be some sort of mental image, picture, or copy of what is remembered. Aristotle said that there must be ‘something like a picture or impression’; William James thought that there must be in the mind 'an image or copy’ of the original event; Russell said that ‘Memory demands an image’. In addition to the image or copy a variety of other mental phenomena have been thought to be necessary. In order for a memory image to be distinguished from an expectation image, the former must be accompanied by ‘a feeling of pastness’. One has confidence that the image is of something that actually occurred because the image is attended by ‘a feeling of familiarity’. And in order that you may be sure that the past event not merely occurred but that you witnessed it, your image of the event must be presented to you with a feeling of ‘warmth and intimacy’. When all the required phenomena are put together, the mental content of remembering turns out to be, as William James says, ‘a very complex representation’.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1975-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127478352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
The Empiricist Account of Dispositions 性格的经验主义解释
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1975-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600001072
R. Woolhouse
{"title":"The Empiricist Account of Dispositions","authors":"R. Woolhouse","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600001072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600001072","url":null,"abstract":"Besides the observable properties it exhibits and the actual processes it undergoes, a thing is full of threats and promises. The dispositions or capacities of a thing — its flexibility, its inflammability, its solubility — are no less important to us than its overt behaviour, but they strike us by comparison as rather ethereal. And so we are moved to inquire whether we can bring them down to earth; whether, that is, we can explain disposition terms without any reference to occult powers.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1975-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127719789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Locke and the Meaning of Colour Words 洛克与颜色词的意义
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1975-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600000972
P. Hacker
{"title":"Locke and the Meaning of Colour Words","authors":"P. Hacker","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600000972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600000972","url":null,"abstract":"While thinking philosophically we see problems in places where there are none. It is for philosophy to show that there are no problems. Those of us who are not colour blind have a happy command of colour concepts. We say of trees that they are green in spring, that they are the same colour as grass and a different colour from the sky. If we shine a torch with a red bulb upon a white surface, we say that the surface looks pink although it is white. And if we suffer a bout of jaundice we (allegedly) claim that white things look yellowish to us, although they are not yellow, nor do they (publicly) look yellow. We employ this tripartite distinction unworriedly and unthinkingly. But when, in doing philosophy, we are called upon to elucidate colour concepts it becomes evident that these elementary concepts present intricate problems to the philosophical understanding. It is extraordinarily difficult to obtain a proper surview of colour grammar, and the temptations of philosophical illusion are legion. We go wrong before the first step is even taken, and hence do not notice our errors, for they are implicit in every move we make. We multiply impossibilities seriatim, getting better, like the White Queen, with practice. We then either slide into scepticism, or alternatively exclude it on empirical grounds - appealing, as is so popular in American philosophical circles, to the wonders of science, in particular physics and neurophysiology, to keep the malin genie from the door.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1975-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127799495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Nature, History and Morality 自然、历史和道德
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1974-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600001254
Shirley Robin Letwin
{"title":"Nature, History and Morality","authors":"Shirley Robin Letwin","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600001254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600001254","url":null,"abstract":"The question that I propose to consider is the ghost in modern philosophy. Its step has been heard more distinctly at some times than at others. But it has never rattled its chains so loudly as during the recent popularity of Existentialism. The question is: How is man related to the universe? All philosophers who pride themselves on being modern reject the ancient answer to the question. The most emancipated modern philosophers refuse to hear the question. Nevertheless some answer to this question is presupposed by all philosophy.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1974-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114414010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Needs, Desires and Moral Turpitude 需求、欲望和道德败坏
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1974-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600001229
R. Wollheim
{"title":"Needs, Desires and Moral Turpitude","authors":"R. Wollheim","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600001229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600001229","url":null,"abstract":"Need and Desire have obvious affinities. In this lecture I shall consider how they are to be distinguished, and how they may be confused: distinguished, that is, within philosophy, and confused in life itself. I shall then consider, very briefly, how this possibility of confusion bears upon morality and moral assessment.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1974-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133701816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Techniques and Values in Policy Decisions 政策决策中的技术和价值
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1974-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600001291
P. Self
{"title":"Techniques and Values in Policy Decisions","authors":"P. Self","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600001291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600001291","url":null,"abstract":"Increasing use is made of techniques which are supposed to make policy decisions more ‘rational’. Rather little attention, however, has been paid to the relation between these techniques and (a) the logic of choice, (b) the political process, (c) value judgements and assumptions. This short paper will investigate these questions in relation to a particularly fashionable technique, that of cost-benefit analysis.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"326 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1974-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129767486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
My Role and its Duties 我的角色和职责
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1974-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600001230
M. Hollis
{"title":"My Role and its Duties","authors":"M. Hollis","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600001230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600001230","url":null,"abstract":"Recipes for the Good Society used to run, in caricature, something like this: 1. Take about 2000 hoM, sap., analyse each into essence and accidents and discard the accidents. 2. Place essences in a large casserole, add socialising syrup and stew until conflict disappears. 3. Serve with a pinch of salt.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1974-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128604702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Natural Supremacy of Conscience 良知的自然至上
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Pub Date : 1974-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0080443600001205
J. Gosling
{"title":"The Natural Supremacy of Conscience","authors":"J. Gosling","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600001205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600001205","url":null,"abstract":"I want to start this paper by drawing a distinction between two uses of the word ‘conscience’ in order to get clear just what it is I shall talk about. The distinction I want to make can perhaps best be brought out by reference to a type of situation which could equally well be described in one or other of two ways, each way illustrating one use of the word ‘conscience’. Suppose then that we have a man who has been brought up to think that it is a good thing to help the poor. This lesson he has been taught, at least in part, by being told stories about beggars asking for money. The good person gives money to the beggars and the wicked person callously refuses it. One year he decides to book himself a holiday in Spain. Before he goes, however, he has a conversation with a social scientist friend. This friend points out to him that the one thing he should not do when in Spain is give money to beggars. Beggary, he argues, is a social evil and one which will only be removed if people take a stand and refuse to go on giving money when asked. The appropriate action to take is to inform the beggar of the whereabouts of the local employment exchange, or take him along to an employer, or do one or other of various rather embarrassing things. If the worst comes to the worst, it is better simply to walk away than to give money. Our man goes to Spain convinced by this argument and realising the unsophisticated and over-simple nature of his earlier moral approach. Before long, a beggar comes up to him and asks for money. Let's suppose that he refuses to give it, because of his newly acquired conviction. Now it seems to me that when he returns he could describe this situation in one or other of two ways without there being any difference as regards the facts that he is asserting.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1974-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130973504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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