{"title":"Voters and the Trade-Off between Policy Stability and Responsiveness","authors":"Wioletta Dziuda, Antoine Loeper","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3908921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3908921","url":null,"abstract":"Policy making involves a trade-off between policy responsiveness and policy stability. Little is known, however, about how this trade-off is resolved in representative democracies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that policies not only do not respond efficiently to changing circumstances but also change unnecessarily with political turnover. We study this trade-off theoretically. In our dynamic election model, a voter and two parties have distinct ideologies, but their policy preferences reflect a common trade-off between the need to adapt the policy to a changing state and a desire for policy stability captured by a cost of policy change. In each period, the voter observes a signal about the state and chooses which party to elect. The appointed party observes the realized state and decides whether to leave the current policy in place or change it. We show that the voter elects more often the party whose ideology is aligned with the status quo. Hence, consistent with the empirical evidence, a liberal (conservative) incumbent is more likely to be reelected after having implemented a liberal (conservative) policy. Expecting this electoral bias, the party in office tends to be less responsive to the state and instead tilts policy making towards its ideology in order to be reelected. As a result, as compared to a world without electoral pressures, policies underrespond to real shocks and overrespond to political turnover. We study how the resulting excessive policy inertia and inefficient policy changes vary with the cost of policy change, voter's information, as well as ideological polarization and office motivation of the political parties.","PeriodicalId":286096,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Political Parties (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129238181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christopher A. D. Charles, Dalkeith Dempster, Trevaun Welcome
{"title":"The Role of the Economy, Security and Party Leader Acceptance in Forecasting the 2020 General Election in Jamaica","authors":"Christopher A. D. Charles, Dalkeith Dempster, Trevaun Welcome","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3776950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3776950","url":null,"abstract":"Three econometric models were built between January and March 2020 to predict the September 3, 2020 General Election in Jamaica. These are the economics and security model (model1), the economics and security model with JLP leader acceptance (model 2), and the economics and security model with PNP leader acceptance (model 3). All three models accurately predicted a win for the Jamaica Labour Party. A Jack-knife resampling was performed for cross validation. These models show how the macro-economy, security concerns and party leader popularity influence election outcomes, with similar findings in the literature. However, there are peculiarities in the Anglophone Caribbean because the\u0000Jamaican voters respond to economic and security concerns in different ways than the voters in the global north. For example, increases in the debt to GDP ratio and the homicide rate predicted a JLP win. This work should be replicated in the Caribbean and Latin America using panel data.","PeriodicalId":286096,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Political Parties (Topic)","volume":"230 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124541839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deprivation and the Electoral Geography of Brexit","authors":"Robert Calvert Jump, J. Michell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3727280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3727280","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the relationship between deprivation and the electoral geography of Brexit, using the most granular referendum data and the most detailed deprivation data currently available. Using rank-based statistics we demonstrate that geographic deprivation is positively associated with Leave voting. However, this relationship is neither strong nor straightforward: educational deprivation drives the association, and once higher educational attainment or occupational composition are controlled for the association becomes negative. This has important implications for narratives that assume a causal mechanism connecting multi-dimensional deprivation with the geography of Brexit.","PeriodicalId":286096,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Political Parties (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121863330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Baker, Aniket Baksy, N. Bloom, S. Davis, Jonathan Rodden
{"title":"Elections, Political Polarization, and Economic Uncertainty","authors":"S. Baker, Aniket Baksy, N. Bloom, S. Davis, Jonathan Rodden","doi":"10.3386/w27961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w27961","url":null,"abstract":"We examine patterns of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) around national elections in 23 countries. Uncertainty shows a clear tendency to rise in the months leading up to elections. Average EPU values are 13% higher in the month of and the month prior to an election than in other months of the same national election cycle, conditional on country effects, time effects, and country-specific time trends. In a closer examination of U.S. data, EPU rises by 28% in the month of presidential elections that are close and polarized, as compared to elections that are neither. This pattern suggests that the 2020 US Presidential Election could see a large rise in economic policy uncertainty. It also suggests larger spikes in uncertainty around future elections in other countries that have experienced rising polarization in recent years.","PeriodicalId":286096,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Political Parties (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125023483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Left Behind: Presidential Cycles and Partisan Gap in Stock Market Participation","authors":"Da Ke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3384406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3384406","url":null,"abstract":"Using longitudinal U.S. household data, I document that Democrats are less likely than Republicans to participate in the stock market. More importantly, the partisan gap in stock market participation widens sharply under Democratic presidencies, precisely when the stock market returns are substantially higher. This dynamic pattern accounts for more than 40 percent of the discrepancy in wealth accumulation between Democrats and Republicans over presidential cycles. Overall, these findings underscore the interplay between individual ideology, household portfolio choice, and changing economic and political landscape.","PeriodicalId":286096,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Political Parties (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127244782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Parties in Power and U.S. Economic Performance","authors":"W. T. Chittenden","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3542494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3542494","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the simultaneous interaction between political control of the White House and both chambers of Congress and the impact of those combinations on various measures of economic activity in the U.S. Past economic growth is not significantly different under Republican and Democratic presidential administrations. Nor does the party that controls the House of Representatives appear to have a significant impact on economic growth. However, growth has been strongest when Republicans control the Senate. Non-farm payrolls and industrial production grow faster under Democratic Presidents, while higher inflation and unemployment are generally observed when Democrats control the Senate or House. Republican Presidents are in office for a significantly greater number of months when the economy is in a recession. The same is true when Democrats are in charge of the Senate or House. The U.S. economy appears to have the strongest performance under the combination of a Democratic President with a Republican controlled Senate and House, and the weakest economic performance is generally under a Republican President with a Senate controlled by Democrats and a Republican controlled House","PeriodicalId":286096,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Political Parties (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127715883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Polarized America: From Political Partisanship to Preference Partisanship","authors":"Verena Schoenmueller, O. Netzer, F. Stahl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3471477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3471477","url":null,"abstract":"In light of the widely discussed political divide post the 2016 election, we investigate in this paper whether this divide extends to the preferences of individuals for commercial brands, media sources and nonprofit organizations and how it evolved post the election. Using publicly available social media data of over 150 million Twitter users’ brand followerships we establish that commercial brands and organizations are affiliated with the consumers political ideology. We create a mosaic of brand preferences that are associated with either sides of the political spectrum, which we term preference partisanship, and explore the extent to which the political divide manifests itself also in the daily lives of individuals. Moreover, we identify an increasing polarization in preference partisanship since Donald Trump became President of the United States. Consistent with compensatory consumption theory, we find the increase in polarization post-election is stronger for liberals relative to conservatives. From a brand perspective, we show that brands can affect their degree of the political polarization by taking a political stand. Finally, after coloring brands as conservative or liberal we investigate the systematic differences and commonalities between them. We provide a publicly available API that allows access to our data and results.","PeriodicalId":286096,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Political Parties (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133527177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Cable News Reshaped Local Government","authors":"Sergio Galletta, Elliott Ash","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3370908","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3370908","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that partisan cable news broadcasts have a causal effect on the size and composition of budgets in US localities. Using exogenous channel positioning as an instrument for viewership, we show that exposure to the conservative Fox News channel reduces revenues and expenditures. Multiple mechanisms drive these results: Fox News improves election chances for local Republicans, alters politician campaign agendas, and shifts voter policy preferences on fiscal issues. Consistent with the priorities of small-government conservatism, we find evidence that private provision compensates for the reduced public services. The “Fox News effect” extends beyond vote shares to rightward policy shifts. (JEL D72, H71, H72, H75, I20, L82)","PeriodicalId":286096,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Political Parties (Topic)","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129113259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Women Mobilize Women Into Politics: A Natural Experiment in India","authors":"Tanu M. Goyal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3583693","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3583693","url":null,"abstract":"Female representation is expected to increase women’s political participation through demonstration effects. Yet, in low-income patriarchal settings, demonstration effects cannot lower family constraints on women’s mobility, and low political knowledge limits the scope of agency. This paper presents a novel argument that accounts for these political economy constraints. I argue that female representation has mobilization effects. Female politicians simultaneously lower family and party-organization constraints to recruit women as party-activists. Consequently, female-led mobilization puts female party-activists at the helm of ground campaigns, shrinking the gender gap in partisan contact; receiving partisan contact mobilizes women’s political participation. Evidence from the natural experiment of randomized gender quotas in Delhi and data from rep- resentative citizen and elite surveys support this argument. Female representation has spillovers through female-led party building which equalizes recruitment and mobilization - two key functions through which parties perpetuate gender inequality.","PeriodicalId":286096,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Political Parties (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117194412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aligning Preferences for Redistribution of Right and Left Wing Voters by Correcting Their Beliefs about Inequality: Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment in Australia","authors":"Christopher Hoy, Russell Toth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3359391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3359391","url":null,"abstract":"Are differences in preferences for redistribution between right and left wing voters amplified because of misperceptions of inequality? To answer this question, we conduct a nationally representative, randomized survey experiment of 2,584 Australians in which respondents either received information about the level of national inequality and economic mobility, their position in the national income distribution, or no information. We show that both types of information about inequality lead to convergence in preferences for redistribution and charitable giving between right and left wing voters. The effect from the treatments are predominantly due to right wing voters becoming more progressive in their views.","PeriodicalId":286096,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Political Parties (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131298321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}