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2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG)最新文献

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A deep learning-based cyber-physical strategy to mitigate false data injection attack in smart grids 基于深度学习的网络物理策略缓解智能电网中的虚假数据注入攻击
2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG) Pub Date : 2016-04-12 DOI: 10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684102
Jin Wei, G. Mendis
{"title":"A deep learning-based cyber-physical strategy to mitigate false data injection attack in smart grids","authors":"Jin Wei, G. Mendis","doi":"10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684102","url":null,"abstract":"Application of computing and communications intelligence effectively improves the quality of monitoring and control of smart grids. However, the dependence on information technology also increases vulnerability to malicious attacks, such as false data injection attacks. In this paper, we propose a deep learning-based cyber-physical protocol to identify and mitigate the information corruption in the problem of maintaining the transient stability of Wide Area Monitoring Systems (WAMSs). The proposed strategy implements the deep learning technique to analyze the real-time measurement data from the geographically distributed Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) and leverages the physical coherence in the power systems to probe and detect the data corruption. We demonstrate the performance of the proposed strategy through the simulation by using the New England 39-bus power system.","PeriodicalId":263733,"journal":{"name":"2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121879445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 53
The privacy case: Matching privacy-protection goals to human and organizational privacy concerns 隐私案例:将隐私保护目标与人类和组织的隐私问题相匹配
2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG) Pub Date : 2016-04-12 DOI: 10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684097
Tudor B. Ionescu, G. Engelbrecht
{"title":"The privacy case: Matching privacy-protection goals to human and organizational privacy concerns","authors":"Tudor B. Ionescu, G. Engelbrecht","doi":"10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684097","url":null,"abstract":"Processing smart grid data for analytics purposes brings about a series of privacy-related risks. In order to allow for the most suitable mitigation strategies, reasonable privacy risks need to be addressed by taking into consideration the perspective of each smart grid stakeholder separately. In this context, we use the notion of privacy concerns to reflect potential privacy risks from the perspective of different smart grid stakeholders. Privacy concerns help to derive privacy goals, which we represent using the goals structuring notation. Thus represented goals can more comprehensibly be addressed through technical and non-technical strategies and solutions. The thread of argumentation - from concerns to goals to strategies and solutions - is presented in form of a privacy case, which is analogous to the safety case used in the automotive domain. We provide an exemplar privacy case for the smart grid developed as part of the Aspern Smart City Research project.","PeriodicalId":263733,"journal":{"name":"2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG)","volume":"220 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122519045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
What's under the hood? Improving SCADA security with process awareness 引擎盖下面是什么?通过过程感知提高SCADA安全性
2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG) Pub Date : 2016-04-12 DOI: 10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684100
J. Chromik, Anne Remke, B. Haverkort
{"title":"What's under the hood? Improving SCADA security with process awareness","authors":"J. Chromik, Anne Remke, B. Haverkort","doi":"10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684100","url":null,"abstract":"SCADA networks are an essential part of monitoring and controlling physical infrastructures, such as the power grid. Recent news items show that tampering with the data exchanged in a SCADA network occurs and has severe consequences. A possible way of improving the security of SCADA networks is to use intrusion detection systems. By monitoring and analysing the traffic, it is possible to detect whether information has a legitimate source or was tampered with. However, in many cases the knowledge of just the traffic is not enough. Detecting intrusions could be improved by including awareness about the physical processes that are controlled. This paper shows a simple analysis of a small scenario of a power distribution system, to illustrate the benefits of including the knowledge about the process in detecting breaches in SCADA.","PeriodicalId":263733,"journal":{"name":"2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121019923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 24
Contextual anomaly detection for cyber-physical security in Smart Grids based on an artificial neural network model 基于人工神经网络模型的智能电网网络物理安全上下文异常检测
2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG) Pub Date : 2016-04-12 DOI: 10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684103
A. Kosek
{"title":"Contextual anomaly detection for cyber-physical security in Smart Grids based on an artificial neural network model","authors":"A. Kosek","doi":"10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684103","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a contextual anomaly detection method and its use in the discovery of malicious voltage control actions in the low voltage distribution grid. The model-based anomaly detection uses an artificial neural network model to identify a distributed energy resource's behaviour under control. An intrusion detection system observes distributed energy resource's behaviour, control actions and the power system impact, and is tested together with an ongoing voltage control attack in a co-simulation set-up. The simulation results obtained with a real photovoltaic rooftop power plant data show that the contextual anomaly detection performs on average 55% better in the control detection and over 56% better in the malicious control detection over the point anomaly detection.","PeriodicalId":263733,"journal":{"name":"2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132611281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 56
A supervisory approach towards cyber-secure generator protection 网络安全发电机保护的监管方法
2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG) Pub Date : 2016-04-12 DOI: 10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684099
R. Kavasseri, Yinan Cui, N. Chaudhuri
{"title":"A supervisory approach towards cyber-secure generator protection","authors":"R. Kavasseri, Yinan Cui, N. Chaudhuri","doi":"10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684099","url":null,"abstract":"Modern microprocessor-based relays can be vulnerable to attacks from sophisticated cyber-adversaries. In the case of synchronous generators, specifically, out of step (OOS) protection, we show that a “hacked” relay can be made to respond exactly contrary to design, which can be disastrous to system operation. We propose a computational alternative - using the concept of Dynamic State Estimation (DSE) and inputs from Phasor Measurement Units to address this problem. Since DSE does not rely on the “settings” used in traditional relays, it can be used to independently supervise the operation of the traditional relay. The generator's dynamic states are continuously tracked and monitored using the DSE module during steady state conditions and the dynamics following a fault. We show that this approach can detect OOS conditions consistent with traditional schemes, thus supervising conventional protection and help detection of anomalous behavior from a compromised relay. Dynamic simulation results are presented on the IEEE 10 machine, 39-bus system to illustrate the proposed approach.","PeriodicalId":263733,"journal":{"name":"2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123461259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The most frequent energy theft techniques and hazards in present power energy consumption 当前电力能源消耗中最常见的窃电技术和危害
2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG) Pub Date : 2016-04-12 DOI: 10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684098
R. Czechowski, A. Kosek
{"title":"The most frequent energy theft techniques and hazards in present power energy consumption","authors":"R. Czechowski, A. Kosek","doi":"10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684098","url":null,"abstract":"One of the challenging problems when it comes to electric energy distribution is electricity theft. Regardless of whether the deed is done on a large scale or only by a single consumer, it is a problem that generates losses and its detection is not always easy. One of the crucial factors making the issue of electricity theft still relevant is the common physical access of the end users to the installations or meters. The article presents not only the factors encouraging energy consumers to engage in dishonest behavior and the techniques they use to achieve the intended result, but also technical measures aimed at detecting such actions. The discussed technical issues can prove useful in designing increasingly refined security measures and ways to detect electricity theft.","PeriodicalId":263733,"journal":{"name":"2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124616276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 28
Including threat actor capability and motivation in risk assessment for Smart GRIDs 包括智能电网风险评估中的威胁行为者能力和动机
2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG) Pub Date : 2016-04-12 DOI: 10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684094
J. Rossebø, F. Fransen, E. Luiijf
{"title":"Including threat actor capability and motivation in risk assessment for Smart GRIDs","authors":"J. Rossebø, F. Fransen, E. Luiijf","doi":"10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684094","url":null,"abstract":"The SEGRID (Security for Smart Electricity GRIDs) collaboration project, funded by the EU under the FP7 program investigates risk assessment methodologies and their possible need for enhancement. In this paper we discuss the need to include threat actor analysis in threat, vulnerability and risk assessments for smart grids based on the first findings of the practical application of the SEGRID approach to risk assessment. We motivate and propose an approach for including the threat actor's capability and motivation in such a threat, vulnerability and risk assessment.","PeriodicalId":263733,"journal":{"name":"2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG)","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116022988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Cascading failures caused by node overloading in complex networks 复杂网络中节点过载导致的级联故障
2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG) Pub Date : 2016-04-12 DOI: 10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684104
V. Turau, C. Weyer
{"title":"Cascading failures caused by node overloading in complex networks","authors":"V. Turau, C. Weyer","doi":"10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684104","url":null,"abstract":"It is well known that complex networks are vulnerable to the failure of hubs in terms of structural robustness. An as yet less researched topic is dynamical robustness, which refers to the ability of a network to maintain its dynamical activity against local disturbances. This paper analyzes the impact of overload attacks in complex networks and gives a precise definition of this type of attack using the load redistribution model. The main contribution is a greedy algorithm to select a small number of candidates for an overload attack maximizing the impact with respect to the number of failed nodes and load increase. The quality of the algorithm is analyzed for a real power grid network.","PeriodicalId":263733,"journal":{"name":"2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG)","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124176611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
On bounded rationality in cyber-physical systems security: Game-theoretic analysis with application to smart grid protection 网络物理系统安全中的有限理性:博弈论分析及其在智能电网保护中的应用
2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG) Pub Date : 2016-04-12 DOI: 10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684101
Anibal Sanjab, W. Saad
{"title":"On bounded rationality in cyber-physical systems security: Game-theoretic analysis with application to smart grid protection","authors":"Anibal Sanjab, W. Saad","doi":"10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684101","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, a general model for cyber-physical systems (CPSs), that captures the diffusion of attacks from the cyber layer to the physical system, is studied. In particular, a game-theoretic approach is proposed to analyze the interactions between one defender and one attacker over a CPS. In this game, the attacker launches cyber attacks on a number of cyber components of the CPS to maximize the potential harm to the physical system while the system operator chooses to defend a number of cyber nodes to thwart the attacks and minimize potential damage to the physical side. The proposed game explicitly accounts for the fact that both attacker and defender can have different computational capabilities and disparate levels of knowledge of the system. To capture such bounded rationality of attacker and defender, a novel approach inspired from the behavioral framework of cognitive hierarchy theory is developed. In this framework, the defender is assumed to be faced with an attacker that can have different possible thinking levels reflecting its knowledge of the system and computational capabilities. To solve the game, the optimal strategies of each attacker type are characterized and the optimal response of the defender facing these different types is computed. This general approach is applied to smart grid security considering wide area protection with energy markets implications. Numerical results show that a deviation from the Nash equilibrium strategy is beneficial when the bounded rationality of the attacker is considered. Moreover, the results show that the defender's incentive to deviate from the Nash equilibrium decreases when faced with an attacker that has high computational ability.","PeriodicalId":263733,"journal":{"name":"2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG)","volume":"9 11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124846487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 32
Analyzing attack resilience of an advanced meter infrastructure reference model 分析一种高级计量基础设施参考模型的攻击弹性
2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG) Pub Date : 2016-04-12 DOI: 10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684095
Rikard Blom, M. Korman, R. Lagerstrom, M. Ekstedt
{"title":"Analyzing attack resilience of an advanced meter infrastructure reference model","authors":"Rikard Blom, M. Korman, R. Lagerstrom, M. Ekstedt","doi":"10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684095","url":null,"abstract":"Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is a key component of the concept of smart power grids. Although several functional/logical reference models of AMI exist, they are not suited for automated analysis of properties such as cyber security. This paper briefly presents a reference model of AMI that follows a tested and even commercially adopted formalism allowing automated analysis of cyber security. Finally, this paper presents an example cyber security analysis, and discusses its results.","PeriodicalId":263733,"journal":{"name":"2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG)","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124848964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
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