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Contributions to Game Theory and Management最新文献

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Non-Zero Sum Network Games with Pairwise Interactions 具有两两相互作用的非零和网络博弈
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.03
M. Bulgakova
{"title":"Non-Zero Sum Network Games with Pairwise Interactions","authors":"M. Bulgakova","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.03","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper non-zero sum games on networks with pairwise interactions are investigated. The first stage is network formation stage, where players chose their preferable set of neighbours. In all following stages simultaneous non-zero sum game appears between connected players in network. As cooperative solutions the Shapley value and τ -value are considered. Due to a construction of characteristic function both formulas are simpli ed. It is proved, that the coeffcient λ in τ -value is independent from network form and number of players or neighbours and is equal to 1/2 . Also it is proved that in this type of games on complete network the Shapley value and τ -value are coincide.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124188326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Modeling of the City’s Transport Network Using Game-Theoretic Methods on the Example of Petrozavodsk 城市交通网络的博弈论建模——以彼得罗扎沃茨克为例
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.02
Nikolay A. Ermolin, V. Khitraya, Andrey V. Khitryi, V. Mazalov, N. Nikitina
{"title":"Modeling of the City’s Transport Network Using Game-Theoretic Methods on the Example of Petrozavodsk","authors":"Nikolay A. Ermolin, V. Khitraya, Andrey V. Khitryi, V. Mazalov, N. Nikitina","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.02","url":null,"abstract":"The paper presents the results of modeling of the city's transport network. The effectiveness of the game-theoretic method for estimating the centrality of graph vertices using the Myerson value is demonstrated on the transport graph. Correspondences in the given graph are found with gravitational and entropy approaches, using the information about citizens and companies distributed by vertices in the graph. The results of computer calculations are represented on the transport network of the city of Petrozavodsk.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131247253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Tax Authority and Taxpayers: How Does Mutual Collecting of Information Affect the Effectiveness of Tax Control 税务机关与纳税人:信息的相互收集如何影响税收控制的有效性
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.12
Suriya Kumacheva, Galina Tomilina
{"title":"Tax Authority and Taxpayers: How Does Mutual Collecting of Information Affect the Effectiveness of Tax Control","authors":"Suriya Kumacheva, Galina Tomilina","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.12","url":null,"abstract":"Lots of works have been devoted to the modelling of tax control. In the classic game-theoretic formulation, the subject of study is the interaction between tax authority and taxpayers. However, along with such attitude to the problem, some works allow us to study auxiliary problems related to tax collection and tax control. Two of these issues are worth mentioning. The first is the dissemination of information about future tax audits among the taxable population. The second is the gathering and analysis of information on the tendency of taxpayers to evasion. It was shown that both processes can be used to adjust the tax authority's strategy and optimize audits in order to improve tax collection. However, the mutual collecting of information on tax audits by the taxpayers and the tax authority decreases the total tax revenue. The study of formulated problem is accompanied by the modelling of both processes, their simulation, and comparative analysis of the results.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130404196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Owen Value for Dynamic Games on Networks 关于网络动态游戏的Owen Value
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.16
Y. Pankratova, L. Petrosyan
{"title":"Owen Value for Dynamic Games on Networks","authors":"Y. Pankratova, L. Petrosyan","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.16","url":null,"abstract":"In the presented paper, we consider dynamic network games with coalition structure in which players cooperate to get the best outcomes. As solution the Owen value is proposed. To simplify the calculations the new characteristic function is introduced based on the possibility of cutting connections by players outside the coalition. For a special case, comparison of the Owen value with other solutions is done.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125191627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Opinion Control Problem with Average-Oriented Opinion Dynamics and Limited Observation Moments 基于平均导向的意见动态和有限观察时刻的意见控制问题
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.09
Gao Jingjing, E. Parilina
{"title":"Opinion Control Problem with Average-Oriented Opinion Dynamics and Limited Observation Moments","authors":"Gao Jingjing, E. Parilina","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.09","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper, we propose a model of opinion dynamics in the presence of a center of influence. The center aims in distributing the opinion closer to the target one minimizing the costs. We consider the case when the center takes into account only some fixed number of observations from the opinion trajectory and taking into account the di erence between the agent's opinion and the socially desired opinion in these periods. The dynamics of the state variable is given by a linear di erence equation. The player's cost is a linear quadratic function with respect to the state variables and the player's strategy. The Euler equation method is used to find the center's optimal strategy. Numerical simulations of the theoretical results are given","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122563587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Algorithm of Hierarchical Matrix Clusterization and Its Applications 层次矩阵聚类算法及其应用
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.13
E. Lezhnina, Elizaveta A. Kalinina
{"title":"Algorithm of Hierarchical Matrix Clusterization and Its Applications","authors":"E. Lezhnina, Elizaveta A. Kalinina","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.13","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, the problem of hierarchial matrix clusterization is discussed. For this, the influence of individuals on the community was used. The problem of dividing the community into groups of related participants has been solved, an appropriate algorithm for finding the most influential community agents has been proposed. Clustering was carried out using an algorithm for reducing the adjacency matrix of a directed graph with nodes representing members of a social network and edges representing relationships between them. The applications to the problems of working groups, advertising in social networks and complex technical systems are considered.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125658845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nash Bargaining Solution as Negotiation Concept for Resource Allocation Problem with Groves-Ledyard Mechanism 格罗夫斯-莱迪亚德机制下资源配置问题的协商概念——纳什议价解
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.16
N. Korgin, V. Korepanov
{"title":"Nash Bargaining Solution as Negotiation Concept for Resource Allocation Problem with Groves-Ledyard Mechanism","authors":"N. Korgin, V. Korepanov","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.16","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by research works on Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining, which leads to the Nash bargaining solution, we analyze experimental data of resource allocation gaming with Groves-Ledyard mechanism. The games were designed in the form of negotiation to allow players to reach consensus. Behavior models based on best response, constant behavior, and Nash bargaining solution are defined. Analysis conducted over decisions made by participants shows that a significant share of all decisions leads to an increase of the Nash bargaining value. It is even higher than the share of decisions that are in agreement with the best-response concept. Consensusended games show light attraction to the Nash bargaining solution, it's less than we obtained in games with the mechanism of Yang-Hajek from another class of so-called proportional allocation mechanisms. We discuss differences of consensus-ended games from timeout-ended games, what decisions lead to the situations with the Nash bargaining value increasing and differences between balanced mechanism Groves-Ledyard and unbalanced mechanism Yang-Hajek.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126484744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Concept of Social Value Orientation in Measuring Cooperative Behavior Incentive in Games 衡量游戏中合作行为激励的社会价值取向概念
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.19
Yuyan Xia, Yin Li
{"title":"Concept of Social Value Orientation in Measuring Cooperative Behavior Incentive in Games","authors":"Yuyan Xia, Yin Li","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.19","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this study is to explore the effects and mechanisms of cooperation indicators such as interpersonal trust, social preferences, and social value orientations on cooperative behavior, and we develop a psychologically grounded model of trust-based cooperation. Some accounts of cooperation in product choice games have focused on developing simple indicators of game severity i.e., the extent to which the game facilitates noncooperative choices that are derived exclusively from the game's payoff structure. However, this approach does not provide a clear explanation of the psychological mechanisms why the game's payoffs affect the rate of cooperation. When considering individuals' social preferences and positive expectations (beliefs) for how to predict the emergence of trust-based cooperation as an expected utility maximizing strategy, we show a simple decision model for trust-based cooperation. In addition, we show how these predictions are associated with a game-specific cooperation index. We then describe under what conditions trust-based cooperation is rationalizable and how trust-based decisions can be understood through the interplay between of payoffs, preferences, and beliefs.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"177 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121611602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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