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Contributions to Game Theory and Management最新文献

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Online-Offline Competition with Heterogeneous Consumers: An Example for No Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium 异质性消费者的线上线下竞争:纯策略纳什均衡不存在的一个例子
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.04
Weixing Ford, Haipeng Han, Jie Zheng
{"title":"Online-Offline Competition with Heterogeneous Consumers: An Example for No Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium","authors":"Weixing Ford, Haipeng Han, Jie Zheng","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.04","url":null,"abstract":"Existing literature on competition between online and offline firms has focused on market conditions that guarantee the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In this note, by constructing a concrete example, we provide a first attempt to show that the equilibrium existence result does not necessarily hold when consumers’ preferences are heterogeneous. Specifically, we consider the competition between one online firm and several offline firms in a market organized as a Salop model, where consumers’ preferences have a binary distribution. We identify a boundary scenario where the type distribution is binary with one type of consumer loyal to online shopping and the other type loyal to offline shopping. We show that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this boundary scenario, which indicates that the market may not be stable under such conditions. Our study contributes to a better understanding of the equilibrium existence conditions for the online versus offline retail competition.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132969883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Durable-strategies Dynamic Game Theory 论持久策略动态博弈论
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.23
D. Yeung, Yingxuan Zhang
{"title":"On Durable-strategies Dynamic Game Theory","authors":"D. Yeung, Yingxuan Zhang","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.23","url":null,"abstract":"An empirically meaningful theory of dynamic games has to incorporate real-life phenomena. Durable strategies, which effects last for a period of time, are prevalent in real-life situations. Revenue generating investments, toxic waste disposal and purchase of durable goods are common examples of durable strategies. This paper first provides a review on durable-strategies dynamic game theory. A practically relevant advancement - random horizon durable-strategies dynamic games - yielding novel results in durable-strategies dynamic games theory is then presented. Dynamic optimization theorem, game formulations and HJB equations are derived. An illustrative example is provided. The theory and solution mechanism of durable-strategies cooperative dynamic games are also discussed.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129263074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-autonomous Linear Quadratic Non-cooperative Differential Games with Continuous Updating 具有连续更新的非自治线性二次非合作微分对策
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.11
I. Kuchkarov, O. Petrosian, Yin Li
{"title":"Non-autonomous Linear Quadratic Non-cooperative Differential Games with Continuous Updating","authors":"I. Kuchkarov, O. Petrosian, Yin Li","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.11","url":null,"abstract":"The subject of this paper is a non-autonomous linear quadratic case of a differential game model with continuous updating. This class of differential games is essentially new where it is assumed that, at each time instant, players have or use information about the game structure defined on a closed time interval with a fixed duration. During the interval information about motion equations and payoff functions of players updates. It is non-autonomy that simulates this effect of updating information. A linear quadratic case for this class of games is particularly important for practical problems arising in the engineering of human-machine interaction. Here we define the Nash equilibrium as an optimality principle and present an explicit form of Nash equilibrium for the linear quadratic case. Also, the case of dynamic updating for the linear quadratic differential game is studied and uniform convergence of Nash equilibrium strategies and corresponding trajectory for a case of continuous updating and dynamic updating is demonstrated.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116133161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Value of the Preexisting Knowledge in an Optimal Control of Pollution Emissions 论既存知识在污染排放最优控制中的价值
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.04
A. Chebotareva, Shimai Su, Sophia Tretyakova, E. Gromova
{"title":"On the Value of the Preexisting Knowledge in an Optimal Control of Pollution Emissions","authors":"A. Chebotareva, Shimai Su, Sophia Tretyakova, E. Gromova","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.04","url":null,"abstract":"For a classical differential game of pollution control, we consider how the possession of specific information would impact the payoff of some players compared to cases in which the knowledge of information is incomplete. To measure the resulting discrepancy, we use the notion of value of information (VoI). Specifically, we study two scenarios, one in which the role of knowledge about the terminal cost is studied, and the other one, in which we analyze the influence of knowledge about the exact value of the upper bound on control. For each case, we obtain explicit analytical expressions for the payoff functions. These functions are used to quantify the exact value of information.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125086132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Game Theoretic Approach to Multi-Agent Transportation Problems on Network 网络上多智能体运输问题的博弈论方法
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.01
Alkhaled Khaled, L. Petrosyan
{"title":"Game Theoretic Approach to Multi-Agent Transportation Problems on Network","authors":"Alkhaled Khaled, L. Petrosyan","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.01","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we consider a network game where players are multi-agent systems (we call them in this paper \"coalitions\") under the condition that the trajectories of players (coalitions) should (have no common arcs, or have no common vertices) i. e. must not intersect. In the same time the trajectories of players inside coalition can intersect (have common arcs,or have common vertices). The last condition complicates the problem, since the sets of strategies turn out to be mutually dependent. A family of Nash equilibrium is constructed and it is also shown that the minimum total time (cost) of players is achieved in a strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium. A cooperative approach to solving the problem is proposed. Also, another cooperative mini maximal approach to solving the problem is investigated. We also consider the proportional solution and the Shapley value to allocate total minimal costs between players. Two approaches for constructing the characteristic function have been developed.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124350588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information Collecting and Dissemination in the Network of Taxpayers: Bayesian Approach 纳税人网络中的信息收集与传播:贝叶斯方法
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.18
Suriya Kumacheva, Galina Tomilina
{"title":"Information Collecting and Dissemination in the Network of Taxpayers: Bayesian Approach","authors":"Suriya Kumacheva, Galina Tomilina","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.18","url":null,"abstract":"The current research is based on the assumption that the result of tax inspections is not only collection of taxes and fines. The information about audited taxpayers is also collected and helps to renew a priori knowledge of each agent's evasion propensity and obtain new a posteriori estimate of this propensity. In the beginning of the following tax period the fiscal authority can correct auditing strategy using updated information on every taxpayer. Each inspection is considered as a repeated game, in which the choice of agents to audit is associated with their revealed tendency to evade. Taxpayers also renew the information on the number of inspected neighbors using their social connections, represented by networks of various con gurations, and estimate the probability of auditing before the next tax period. Thus, the application of the Bayesian approach to the process of collecting and disseminating information in the network of taxpayers allows to optimize the audit scheme, reducing unnecessary expenses of tax authority and eventually increasing net tax revenue. To illustrate the application of the approach described above to the indicated problem, numerical simulation and scenario analysis were carried out.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134283458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Implementation of Subgame-Perfect Cooperative Agreement in an Extensive-Form Game 广义博弈中子博弈完全合作协议的实现
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.19
D. Kuzyutin, Yulia Skorodumova, N. Smirnova
{"title":"Implementation of Subgame-Perfect Cooperative Agreement in an Extensive-Form Game","authors":"D. Kuzyutin, Yulia Skorodumova, N. Smirnova","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.19","url":null,"abstract":"A novel approach to sustainable cooperation called subgameperfect core (S-P Core) was introduced by P. Chander and M. Wooders in 2020 for n-person extensive-form games with terminal payoffs. This solution concept incorporates both subgame perfection and cooperation incentives and implies certain distribution of the total players' payoff at the terminal node of the cooperative history. We use in the paper an extension of the S-P Core to the class of extensive games with payoffs defined at all nodes of the game tree that is based on designing an appropriate payoff distribution procedure β and its implementation when a game unfolds along the cooperative history. The difference is that in accordance with this so-called β-subgameperfect core the players can redistribute total current payoff at each node in the cooperative path. Moreover, a payoff distribution procedure from the β-S-P Core satisfies a number of good properties such as subgame efficiency, non-negativity and strict balance condition. In the paper, we examine different properties of the β-S-P Core, introduce several refinements of this cooperative solution and provide examples of its implementation in extensive-form games. Finally, we consider an application of the β-S-P Core to the symmetric discrete-time alternating-move model of fishery management.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115902466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
About Construction of Realizability Arias of Salesman Strategies in Dynamic Salesmen Problem 动态推销员问题中推销员策略可实现性咏调的构建
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.10
Anastasiya V. Gavrilova, Y. Pankratova
{"title":"About Construction of Realizability Arias of Salesman Strategies in Dynamic Salesmen Problem","authors":"Anastasiya V. Gavrilova, Y. Pankratova","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.10","url":null,"abstract":"The dynamic travelling salesman problem, where we assume that all objects can move with constant velocity, is considered. To solve this NPhard problem we use a game-theoretic approach and well-known solution concepts of pursuit games. We identify the realizability areas of salesman strategies depending on the initial positions of customers and their velocities. We present different cases of realizability areas of salesman strategies constructing in Python program with several numbers of customers.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124455118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cooperative n-person Prisoner's Dilemma on a Network 网络上的合作n人囚徒困境
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.11
A. L. Grinikh, L. Petrosyan
{"title":"Cooperative n-person Prisoner's Dilemma on a Network","authors":"A. L. Grinikh, L. Petrosyan","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.11","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper n-person prisoner's dilemma on the network is investigated. A cooperative game with the pairwise interaction of players is constructed. The model is a modification of the classic 2-person prisoner's dilemma problem in the game theory. Network interaction provide an ability to take into account the in uence only to the adjacent players from the whole set of players. The feature of the game is found that allows to make a decision about necessity of playing dominated strategy by a few players. This solution is based on the number of the adjacent players. The work is a continuation of the paper published earlier by Grinikh A.L. and Petrosyan L.A. in 2021.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123074525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Difference Stackelberg Game Theoretic Model of Innovations Management in Universities 高校创新管理的差异性博弈模型
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.08
Vassily Yu. Kalachev, G. Ougolnitsky, A. Usov
{"title":"Difference Stackelberg Game Theoretic Model of Innovations Management in Universities","authors":"Vassily Yu. Kalachev, G. Ougolnitsky, A. Usov","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.08","url":null,"abstract":"We built a two-level difference game theoretic model \"federal state universities\" in open-loop strategies. The leading player (Principal) is the state or its representative bodies, the followers (agents) are competing a la Cournot universities. The agents assign their resources to the development of new online teaching courses which are considered as their innovative investments. An optimality principle from the point of view of agents is a set of Nash equilibria in their game in normal form, and from the point of view of the Principal it is a solution of the direct or inverse Stackelberg game \"Principal-agents\". The respective dynamic problems of conflict control are solved by means of the Pontryagin maximum principle and simulation modeling. The received results are analyzed, and the main conclusion is that two-level system of control of the innovative educational products promotion in the universities is necessary.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"1164 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131993879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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