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Contributions to Game Theory and Management最新文献

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Dynamic Structure in a Four-strategy Game: Theory and Experiment 四策略博弈中的动态结构:理论与实验
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 2022-03-28 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.26
Zhijian Wang, Shujie Zhou, Qinmei Yao, Yijia Wang
{"title":"Dynamic Structure in a Four-strategy Game: Theory and Experiment","authors":"Zhijian Wang, Shujie Zhou, Qinmei Yao, Yijia Wang","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.26","url":null,"abstract":"Game dynamics theory, as any field of science, the consistency between theory and experiment is essential. In the past 10 years, important progress has been made in the merging of the theory and experiment in this field, in which dynamics cycle is the presentation. However, the achievement failed to eliminate the constraints of the Euclidean two-dimensional cycle. This paper uses a classic four-strategy game to study the dynamic structure (non-Euclidean superplane cycle). The consistency is in significant between the three ways: (1) analytical results from evolutionary dynamics equations, (2) agent-based simulation results from learning models and (3) laboratory results from human subjects game experiments. The consistency suggests that, the game dynamic structure could be quantitatively predictable, observable, and controllable in general.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122373710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Dynamic Games with Incomplete Knowledge in Metric Spaces 度量空间中不完全知识的动态博弈
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 2021-07-02 DOI: 10.24108/preprints-3112252
I. Konnov
{"title":"Dynamic Games with Incomplete Knowledge in Metric Spaces","authors":"I. Konnov","doi":"10.24108/preprints-3112252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24108/preprints-3112252","url":null,"abstract":"We describe a model of a discrete time dynamic system with active elements (players). All the system states are contained in a set of a metric space. Each state is associated with the common \u0000system utility value and player shares. Feasible coalitions of players can change the system state, but each move requires certain expenses. We suppose that the players may have only restricted and local knowledge about the system. We define the concept of an equilibrium state in this dynamic game and present iterative algorithms that create feasible trajectories tending to equilibrium states under rather general \u0000conditions.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121700769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stochastic data transmission model with uncertainty on dropper's appearance 考虑滴管外形不确定性的随机数据传输模型
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2020.24
J. Xue, E. Parilina
{"title":"Stochastic data transmission model with uncertainty on dropper's appearance","authors":"J. Xue, E. Parilina","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2020.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2020.24","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a stochastic dynamic game with uncertainty about appearance of an dropper in infinite time horizon. For the lack of information about whether the dropper is present or not, two different states of nature can appear with some given probabilities at each stage. We study the non-cooperative behavior of players, and Nash equilibrium is considered as an equilibrium concept. We investigate how limited information about the dropper's appearance impacts the anti-jamming strategy.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128420697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Games and network structures on corruption, income inequality, and tax control 腐败、收入不平等和税收控制的博弈和网络结构
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/SPBU31.2020.09
E. Gubar, E. Carrera, Suriya Kumacheva, E. Zhitkova, Galina Tomilina
{"title":"Games and network structures on corruption, income inequality, and tax control","authors":"E. Gubar, E. Carrera, Suriya Kumacheva, E. Zhitkova, Galina Tomilina","doi":"10.21638/11701/SPBU31.2020.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/SPBU31.2020.09","url":null,"abstract":"The income tax system is the main instrument of fiscal policy that aims to improve income distribution and economic growth, but the problem arises when there is corrupt behavior in that system. While the tax audit is a tax control tool that is costly, the tax system should guarantee, however, the instruments for tax collection. In this research work, we formulate a model in which all taxpayers decide to pay taxes or not according to their personal income, individual preferences with respect to the audit and tax control information perceived in their social environment. We develop a theoretical model to study the structure of citizen networks that must pay taxes. First, we assume that citizens are classified by two social groups, the rich and the poor. When all citizens are taxpayers, but public authorities are corrupt, we show that the poor group is the most affected by corruption. However, when taxpayers are corrupt or tax evaders, we implement mechanisms to audit and control this corrupt behavior. Hence, we show that this situation of corruption and control of tax payments can be represented by several well-known theoretical games. Then, we apply the evolutionary theory of the game in the network considering that each taxpayer receives information from his∖her neighbors about the probability of audit and that he∖she could react according to his∖her risk status and real income. Such behavior forms a group of informed agents that propagate the information beyond the proportions of the informed and uninformed contributors that are modified. Our evolutionary model in the structure of the network describes the changes in the population of taxpayers driven by the impact of information on the future fiscal audit. Our simulation analysis shows that the initial and final preferences of taxpayers depend on important parameters, that is, taxes and fines, audit information and costs.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127170474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Dynamic Shapley Value in the Game with Perishable Goods 易腐物品博弈中的动态Shapley值
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.20
Li Yin, O. Petrosian, Zou Jinying
{"title":"Dynamic Shapley Value in the Game with Perishable Goods","authors":"Li Yin, O. Petrosian, Zou Jinying","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.20","url":null,"abstract":"The paper investigates two-stage stochastic minimum spanning tree games with perishable goods. The cooperative behaviour of the players is defined. At each stage, all players jointly take action to construct a network with a cost matrix. At the second stage, a particular player may leave the game, and the probability of this leaving depends on the cooperative behaviour of all players at the first stage. At each stage game, the total cost of the spanning tree is calculated to include the sum of the costs of the contained edges and the cost of the loss of perishable goods expended on that edge of the spanning tree. The characteristic functions in the game are considered, and the dynamic Shapley values are modified. The time consistency of the dynamic Shapley values is studied.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122618375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Dynamic Cost-Sharing Game with Spanning Arborescence 跨越树篱的动态成本分担博弈
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.21
Peichen Ye, Yin Li, O. Petrosian
{"title":"Dynamic Cost-Sharing Game with Spanning Arborescence","authors":"Peichen Ye, Yin Li, O. Petrosian","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.21","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the dynamic Shapley value for cost-sharing game with spanning arborescence. The cooperative behaviour of players is determined, and a two-stage directed network game is considered. At each stage, a cost matrix associated with the directed network is defined by players adopting strategies, and a minimum cost spanning arborescence on the directed network is determined. After the first stage, a particular player will leave the game with a certain probability, which depends on all players' behaviours in the first stage. The characteristic function is defined. Using the Imputation Distribution Procedure(IDP), the dynamic Shapley value in the game is constructed.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124611322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two-Level Cooperative Game on Hypergraph 超图上的两级合作博弈
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.17
David A. Kosian, L. Petrosyan
{"title":"Two-Level Cooperative Game on Hypergraph","authors":"David A. Kosian, L. Petrosyan","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.17","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper, the cooperative game with a hypergraph communication structure is considered. For this class of games, a new allocation rule was proposed by splitting the original game into a game between hyperlinks and games within them. The communication possibilities are described by the hypergraph in which the nodes are players and hyperlinks are the communicating subgroups of players. The game between hyperlinks and between players in each hyperlink is described. The payoff of each player is influenced by the actions of other players dependent on the distance between them on hypergraph. Constructed characteristic functions based on cooperative behaviour satisfy the convexity property. The results are shown by the example.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126876959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Solution of the Meeting Time Choice Problem for n Persons n人会议时间选择问题的求解
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.22
Vladimir V. Yashin
{"title":"Solution of the Meeting Time Choice Problem for n Persons","authors":"Vladimir V. Yashin","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.22","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a game-theoretic model of negotiations of n persons about a meeting time. The problem is to determine the time of the meeting, with the consensus of all players required to make a final decision. The solution is found by backward induction in the class of stationary strategies. Players' wins are represented by piecewise linear functions having one peak. An subgame perfect equilibrium for the problem in the case of δ ≤ 1/2 is found in analytical form.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129974446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The τ-value in Multistage Games with Pairwise Interactions 具有两两相互作用的多阶段对策的τ值
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.03
M. Bulgakova
{"title":"The τ-value in Multistage Games with Pairwise Interactions","authors":"M. Bulgakova","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.03","url":null,"abstract":"We consider multistage bimatrix games with pairwise interactions. On the first stage players chose their neighbours and formed a network. On the later stages bimatrix games between neighbours by network take places. As a solution consider the τ-value (Tijs, 1987). Earlier we calculated coefficient λ of τ-value in case of two-stage game. Now we consider a general case of one-stage game with any players and any number of links. We assumed followings: N is set of players, N ≥ 2 and any type of network g. It is also assumed, that there are not necessarily paths between every pair of vertices. We will consider conditions for time-consistency of τ-value in two-stage game.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116354726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Categorical Characterization of a ①-Iteratively De ned State of Common Knowledge 共同知识的迭代定义状态的分类表征
Contributions to Game Theory and Management Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.24
F. Tohmé, G. Caterina, Rocco Gangle
{"title":"A Categorical Characterization of a ①-Iteratively De ned State of Common Knowledge","authors":"F. Tohmé, G. Caterina, Rocco Gangle","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.24","url":null,"abstract":"We present here a novel approach to the analysis of common knowledge based on category theory. In particular, we model the global epistemic state for a given set of agents through a hierarchy of beliefs represented by a presheaf construction. Then, by employing the properties of a categorical monad, we prove the existence of a state, obtained in an iterative fashion, in which all agents acquire common knowledge of some underlying statement. In order to guarantee the existence of a fixed point under certain suitable conditions, we make use of the properties entailed by Sergeyev's numeral system called grossone, which allows a finer control on the relevant structure of the infinitely nested epistemic states.","PeriodicalId":235627,"journal":{"name":"Contributions to Game Theory and Management","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130706083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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