2006 2nd IEEE Workshop on Secure Network Protocols最新文献

A Proposal of Anonymous IEEE802.1X Authentication Protocol for Wireless Networks 一种无线网络匿名IEEE802.1X认证协议方案

2006 2nd IEEE Workshop on Secure Network Protocols Pub Date : 2006-11-12 DOI: 10.1109/NPSEC.2006.320343

N. Funabiki, T. Nakanishi, H. Takahashi, K. Miki, J. Kawashima

引用次数: 3

2006 2nd IEEE Workshop on Secure Network Protocols Pub Date : 2006-11-12 DOI: 10.1109/NPSEC.2006.320344

A. Bremler-Barr, R. Halachmi-Bekel, J. Kangasharju

{"title":"Unregister Attacks in SIP","authors":"A. Bremler-Barr, R. Halachmi-Bekel, J. Kangasharju","doi":"10.1109/NPSEC.2006.320344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/NPSEC.2006.320344","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we present the unregister attack, a new kind of a denial of service attack on SIP servers. In this attack, the attacker sends a spoofed \"unregister\" message to a SIP server and cancels the registration of the victim at that server. This prevents the victim user from receiving any calls. We have tested common implementations of SIP servers and show that the unregister attack is easily performed on SIP servers which do not use authentication. Even on SIP servers with authentication, an attacker able to sniff the traffic between the client and server can still successfully attack common servers. We show that the root causes behind this vulnerability are either buggy implementations, or the SIP specification RFC which does not require sufficient security from the implementations. We present a solution, the SIP one-way hash function algorithm (SOFIA), motivated by the onetime password mechanism [6]. SOFIA prevents the unregister attack in all situations. The algorithm is easy to deploy since it requires only a minor modification, namely adding one header field into the SIP messages. Furthermore, the algorithm is fully backwards compatible and requires no additional configuration from the user or the server.","PeriodicalId":206067,"journal":{"name":"2006 2nd IEEE Workshop on Secure Network Protocols","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114782871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 22

Firewall Policy Reconstruction by Active Probing: An Attacker's View 主动探测防火墙策略重构:攻击者视角

2006 2nd IEEE Workshop on Secure Network Protocols Pub Date : 2006-11-12 DOI: 10.1109/NPSEC.2006.320342

T. Samak, A. El-Atawy, E. Al-Shaer, Hong Li

引用次数: 13

PEUC-WiN: Privacy Enhancement by User Cooperation in Wireless Networks PEUC-WiN:无线网络中用户合作的隐私增强

2006 2nd IEEE Workshop on Secure Network Protocols Pub Date : 2006-11-12 DOI: 10.1109/NPSEC.2006.320345

Karim El Defrawy, Claudio Soriente

引用次数: 2

Automatic Vulnerability Checking of IEEE 802.16 WiMAX Protocols through TLA+ 基于TLA+的IEEE 802.16 WiMAX协议漏洞自动检测

2006 2nd IEEE Workshop on Secure Network Protocols Pub Date : 2006-11-12 DOI: 10.1109/NPSEC.2006.320346

P. Narayana, Ruiming Chen, Yao Zhao, Yan Chen, Z. Fu, Hai Zhou

引用次数: 27

Efficient Techniques for Detecting False Origin Advertisements in Inter-domain Routing 域间路由中虚假源通告的有效检测技术

2006 2nd IEEE Workshop on Secure Network Protocols Pub Date : 2006-11-12 DOI: 10.1109/NPSEC.2006.320341

S. Y. Qiu, F. Monrose, A. Terzis, P. Mcdaniel

{"title":"Efficient Techniques for Detecting False Origin Advertisements in Inter-domain Routing","authors":"S. Y. Qiu, F. Monrose, A. Terzis, P. Mcdaniel","doi":"10.1109/NPSEC.2006.320341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/NPSEC.2006.320341","url":null,"abstract":"The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), and hence the Internet, remains critically vulnerable to a range of prefix forgery attacks. In this paper, we address these attacks by proposing a non-cryptographic, incrementally deployable mechanism to probabilistically detect forged BGP origin advertisements. Upon receiving an advertisement from a \"suspicious\" origin, the receiving domain intelligently probes other ASes about the received information. Any dissenting information indicates potential forgery or error, and is reported by the polled ASes to the true origin and processed appropriately. In this design, we exploit the fact that the highly connected AStopology makes it difficult to block the dissemination of information as it traverses the Internet. We evaluate the effectiveness of our probing mechanism via simulation on realistic Internet topologies. The experiments show that 98% of forgeries can be detected even when as few as 10% of the ASes participate in the protocol under a naive polling stratagem. Moreover, we show that judicious node selection can further improve detection rates while minimizing the number of probes.","PeriodicalId":206067,"journal":{"name":"2006 2nd IEEE Workshop on Secure Network Protocols","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125134473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 32

Reducing the Impact of DoS Attacks on Endpoint IP Security 减少DoS攻击对终端IP安全的影响

2006 2nd IEEE Workshop on Secure Network Protocols Pub Date : 2006-11-12 DOI: 10.1109/NPSEC.2006.320340

J. Touch, Y.-H.E. Yang

引用次数: 4