The strategic implications of ‘sea blindness’ in the Australian LNG trade dynamic

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this Maritime Century, the notion of ‘sea blindness' is an interesting development. There is a perception that Australia has long experienced a ‘sea blindness', where the sense of the sea and surroundings is not generally apparent in Australians [Jones, J. 2013. A Maritime School of Strategic Thought for Australia, vol. 1, Sea Power Centre. Canberra: ACT]. However, reference to ‘sea blindness' is not restricted to Australia's circumstance alone. Britain's ‘dangerously weak Royal Navy' [Beazley, Kim C. 1989. The Development of Australian Maritime Strategy, Selected Speeches 1985-1989 by the Hon Kim C Beazley, MP, Minister for Defence. Canberra: Directorate of Departmental Publications] and reliance on sea traffic elicited the phrase in 2009 when Britain's policy-makers were branded as suffering ‘sea blindness' an accusation substantiated in relation to the need for security, vulnerability to interruption of supply, and a weakened naval force structure. A nationwide survey of Seafarers UK in 2011, suggested that the British public had an alarming ignorance of the island's dependence on the sea and that ‘sea blindness' was a ‘huge problem' [Harvey, N. 2011. “Finding a Cure for Sea Blindness.” The Maritime Foundation. Accessed January 16, 2019. https://www.maritimefoundation.uk/2011/finding-a-cure-forsea-blindness]. Yet in 2017 a further opinion poll conducted by the UK Chamber of shipping confirmed that ‘seablindness is a myth' [Roberts, J. 2017. “Opinion Poll Confirms ‘Seablindness' is a Myth, UK Chamber of Shipping.” Accessed January 16, 2019. https://www.ukchamberofshipping.com/latest/opinion-poll-confirmsseablindness-myth]. Does ‘sea blindness' exist in the Australian circumstance? An intimate appreciation of the Australian LNG trade could provide a publicly visible appreciation of Australia’s strategic maritime circumstance in relation to other sovereign interests.