Determinants of Hedge Fund Investment in Corporate Endgames

Abstract

Under German law the corporate endgame process of obtaining full control over a company offers multiple investment opportunities for investors with high investment flexibility, and is therefore particularly attractive to hedge funds. This paper investigates the determinants of hedge fund investment in corporate endgame processes based on a sample of 76 endgame situations of publicly listed German companies and investment data of 326 hedge funds. Examining characteristics of investment targets, we find that hedge funds invest in companies with a non-dominant majority owner and high stake of index funds as latter’s inability to react in change of control situations creates a supportive investment environment for hedge funds. Hedge funds are most likely to invest after takeover consummation and before announcement of a new endgame transaction. Investigating the determinants of ongoing engagement after initial investment, we find that the presence of other institutional investors, especially hedge funds positively affects engagement likelihood, serving as a validation of the own investment approach. Abnormal performance and trading liquidity of target stock also positively affect hedge funds’ engagement. The results indicate that the endgame process in Germany is an attractive investment opportunity for hedge funds, while hedge fund involvement also adds complexity to the corporate control process.