{"title":"Does information about auditor switches affect investing decisions?","authors":"Arnold Schneider","doi":"10.1016/j.racreg.2015.03.004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines the impact of auditor dismissals and resignations on investing decisions. The study also aims to ascertain whether these decisions differ due to a reason given for the dismissal or resignation. Participants were given a scenario involving an investing decision and were first asked to assess the level of risk associated with investing in the company. Next, they were asked to allocate $10,000 between investing in the company versus a money market account. Five different questionnaires were created by varying information about an auditor switch and the reason for the switch. Results indicated that auditor switches produce higher investment risk assessments and marginally lower amounts invested than no auditor switches. Furthermore, the effects of resignations were not significantly different from the effects of dismissals. Also, disclosure of a disagreement as a reason for an auditor switch had no impact.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101074,"journal":{"name":"Research in Accounting Regulation","volume":"27 1","pages":"Pages 39-44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.racreg.2015.03.004","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Research in Accounting Regulation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1052045715000053","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Abstract
This study examines the impact of auditor dismissals and resignations on investing decisions. The study also aims to ascertain whether these decisions differ due to a reason given for the dismissal or resignation. Participants were given a scenario involving an investing decision and were first asked to assess the level of risk associated with investing in the company. Next, they were asked to allocate $10,000 between investing in the company versus a money market account. Five different questionnaires were created by varying information about an auditor switch and the reason for the switch. Results indicated that auditor switches produce higher investment risk assessments and marginally lower amounts invested than no auditor switches. Furthermore, the effects of resignations were not significantly different from the effects of dismissals. Also, disclosure of a disagreement as a reason for an auditor switch had no impact.
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