To Disclose or Deceive? Sharing Secret Information between Aligned States

IF 4.8 1区社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International Security Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI:10.1162/isec_a_00402

Melinda Haas, Keren Yarhi-Milo

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引用次数: 5

Abstract

Why do aligned states sometimes disclose secret information about their miitary plans to use force, whereas other times they choose to deceive their partners? The state initiating these plans may choose among four information-sharing strategies: collusion, compartmentalization, concealment, and lying. Three main considerations shape its decision: the state's assessment of whether it needs its partner's capabilities to succeed at the military mission, the state's perception of whether the partner will be willing to support the state in the requested role, and the state's anticipated deception costs for not fully informing its partner state. Several cases illustrate how these strategies are chosen: Israel, Britain, and France's decision to use force against Egypt during the Suez Crisis (collusion between France and Israel, and concealment vis-à-vis the United States); Israel's 2007 bombing of Syria's al Kibar reactor (compartmentalization); and Israel's deliberations whether to attack Iran's nuclear reactor (lying). These strategies have implications for intra-alliance restraint and contribute to understanding deception and secrecy between allies.

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披露还是欺骗?盟国之间共享秘密信息

为什么结盟国家有时会披露有关其使用武力的军事计划的秘密信息，而其他时候他们却选择欺骗他们的伙伴?启动这些计划的国家可以在四种信息共享策略中选择:勾结、隔离、隐瞒和撒谎。三个主要考虑因素影响其决定:国家对是否需要其合作伙伴的能力来成功完成军事任务的评估，国家对合作伙伴是否愿意支持国家所要求的角色的看法，以及国家因未充分告知其合作伙伴国家而预期的欺骗成本。有几个案例说明了这些策略是如何选择的:以色列、英国和法国在苏伊士危机期间决定对埃及使用武力(法国和以色列勾结，对-à-vis美国隐瞒);以色列2007年轰炸叙利亚的al Kibar反应堆(分隔);以色列正在考虑是否要攻击伊朗的核反应堆(撒谎)。这些策略对联盟内部的约束有影响，有助于理解盟友之间的欺骗和保密。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

International Security Social Sciences-Law

CiteScore

7.40

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： International Security publishes lucid, well-documented essays on the full range of contemporary security issues. Its articles address traditional topics of war and peace, as well as more recent dimensions of security, including environmental, demographic, and humanitarian issues, transnational networks, and emerging technologies. International Security has defined the debate on US national security policy and set the agenda for scholarship on international security affairs for more than forty years. The journal values scholarship that challenges the conventional wisdom, examines policy, engages theory, illuminates history, and discovers new trends. Readers of IS discover new developments in: The causes and prevention of war U.S.-China relations Great power politics Ethnic conflict and intra-state war Terrorism and insurgency Regional security in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America U.S. foreign and defense policy International relations theory Diplomatic and military history Cybersecurity and defense technology Political economy, business, and security Nuclear proliferation.