Fifth part of the definition of knowledge

Abstract

In this paper, I raise a problem for the widely accepted view that knowledge is degettierized justified true belief. The problem is that one can acquire degettierized justified true beliefs even if one is unable to apply those beliefs in practice or use them in the formation of further justified beliefs. Such beliefs, even though degettierized, justified and true, hardly amount to knowledge. So a fifth part of the definition of knowledge is called for. As a solution, I suggest that beliefs count as knowledge only when they are structured in such a way that they can be employed in the process of beliefor knowledge-formation. This required structure can be explicated in terms of Wiśniewski‟s logic of questions. In order for a belief to count as knowledge, I will argue, it is necessary for it to be liable to figure in an erotetic argument. 1 I thank anonymous referees who have suggested a number of amendments.