Supplier Collaboration in Collaborative Product Development with Internal Competition

IF 0.1 4区 工程技术 Q4 ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING
Timofey Shalpegin, Svenja C. Sommer, C. van Delft
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

This paper examines a development process in which a firm explores alternative approaches for the development of a single product. To do this, the firm employs competing internal teams, but it also needs to involve key suppliers who are responsible for the development of a key component (or subsystem) via a collaboration with one or several internal teams. We explore how internal competition affects the suppliers' collaborative efforts and the firm's profits, and also how the firm should allocate the internal teams to potential suppliers. Our analysis suggests that this setting is significantly different from standard tournament settings, implying that existing research results should not be simply extrapolated to supply chain settings. For example, unlike in traditional tournaments, we find that increasing supplier competition by increasing the number of teams per supplier can actually increase supplier efforts. We develop a tournament model with two suppliers who differ both in their expertise for the specific type of development project and in their development costs (i.e., their cost-effectiveness). We also identify a critical influential factor: the cost savings resulting from the similarity between different development efforts by the same supplier (with different internally competing teams). If the cost savings are not very high, i.e., if the different development efforts are not very similar, the firm should optimally allocate more teams to the supplier with less relevant expertise or lower cost-effectiveness. Similarly, involving a third supplier is beneficial only if the cost savings are low. While companies make significant efforts to identify the supplier with the best expertise, our results show that allocating more teams to the stronger supplier generally undermines the suppliers' incentives to exert high levels of effort. Hence, allocating the most teams to that supplier might not always improve firm profits.
基于内部竞争的协同产品开发中的供应商协作
本文考察了一个开发过程,在这个过程中,一个公司探索了开发单一产品的替代方法。要做到这一点,公司雇佣相互竞争的内部团队,但是它也需要通过与一个或几个内部团队的合作,让负责关键组件(或子系统)开发的关键供应商参与进来。我们探讨了内部竞争如何影响供应商的合作努力和公司的利润,以及公司应该如何分配内部团队给潜在的供应商。我们的分析表明,这种设置与标准锦标赛设置有很大不同,这意味着现有的研究结果不应简单地外推到供应链设置。例如,与传统比赛不同,我们发现通过增加每个供应商的团队数量来增加供应商竞争实际上可以增加供应商的努力。我们开发了一个锦标赛模型,其中有两个供应商,他们在特定类型的开发项目的专业知识和开发成本(即成本效益)方面都不同。我们还确定了一个关键的影响因素:同一供应商(与不同的内部竞争团队)的不同开发工作之间的相似性所带来的成本节约。如果节省的成本不是很高,也就是说,如果不同的开发工作不是非常相似,公司应该将更多的团队分配给具有较少相关专业知识或较低成本效益的供应商。同样,只有在成本节约很低的情况下,让第三方供应商参与才是有益的。当公司做出重大努力来识别具有最佳专业知识的供应商时,我们的结果表明,将更多的团队分配给更强大的供应商通常会破坏供应商付出高水平努力的动机。因此,将最多的团队分配给该供应商可能并不总是能提高公司利润。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Manufacturing Engineering
Manufacturing Engineering 工程技术-工程:制造
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
审稿时长
6-12 weeks
期刊介绍: Information not localized
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