On the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in strategic-form games

IF 16.4 1区化学 Q1 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

Accounts of Chemical Research Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI:10.3934/jdg.2020006

J. Minagawa

引用次数: 2

Abstract

We consider a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in strategic-form games: for any two distinct strategy profiles, there is a player who can obtain a higher payoff by unilaterally changing the strategy from one strategy profile to the other strategy profile. An example of a game that satisfies this condition is the prisoner's dilemma. Viewed as a solution concept, the Nash equilibrium satisfying the condition is stronger than strict Nash Equilibrium and weaker than strict dominant strategy equilibrium.

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论策略型对策中纳什均衡的唯一性

我们考虑了策略形式博弈中纳什均衡唯一性的一个充分条件:对于任意两个不同的策略配置，存在一个参与人可以通过单方面将策略从一个策略配置改变为另一个策略配置来获得更高的收益。满足这个条件的一个例子是囚徒困境。作为一个解概念，满足该条件的纳什均衡强于严格纳什均衡，弱于严格优势策略均衡。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Accounts of Chemical Research 化学-化学综合

CiteScore

31.40

自引率

1.10%

发文量

312

审稿时长

2 months

期刊介绍： Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance. Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.