Proposed Timing Requirements for the Common-Law Motion to Withdraw a Plea: The Creation of a New Procedure in State v. Gonzalez, 285 Neb. 940, 830 N.W. 2d 504 (2013).

M. A. Wailes
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Abstract

This Note traces the Nebraska Supreme Court’s creation and development of the common law motion to withdraw a plea. In 2013, the court recognized this new procedure which allows defendants to withdraw their guilty or no contest pleas after their conviction has become final. The procedure is available only in extremely limited circumstances and only when (1) the Nebraska Postconviction Act is not, and never was, available to the defendant as a means of asserting the grounds justifying withdrawing the plea, and (2) a constitutional right is at issue. The court has only addressed this procedure three times since it initially created the common-law procedure in State v. Gonzalez, 285 Neb. 940, 830 N.W. 2d 504 (2013) and has not yet clarified when defendants can raise this motion. Because the common-law procedure is intended to be a substitute when the Postconviction Act is not available to the defendant, this author argues that the timing requirements of the Nebraska Postconviction Act should apply to common law motions to withdraw a plea. Specifically, the author argues that defendants should be required to file their motion within one year of: 1) The date the judgment or conviction became final by the conclusion of a direct appeal or the expiration of the time for filing a direct appeal;2) The date on which the factual predicate of the constitutional claim or claims alleged could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence; or3) The date on which a constitutional claim asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Nebraska Supreme Court, if the newly recognized right has been made applicable retroactively to cases on postconviction collateral review.
撤销抗辩的普通法动议的拟议时间要求:在州诉冈萨雷斯案中建立一个新程序,285 Neb. 940, 830 N.W. 2d 504(2013)。
本附注追溯了内布拉斯加州最高法院关于撤销抗辩的普通法动议的创立和发展。2013年,法院认可了这一新程序,允许被告在最终定罪后撤回有罪或不抗辩请求。该程序仅在极其有限的情况下适用,并且仅在以下情况下适用:(1)被告没有,也从来没有使用《内布拉斯加州定罪后法案》作为主张撤销抗辩理由的手段,以及(2)涉及宪法权利。自最初在州诉冈萨雷斯案(285 Neb. 940, 830 N.W. 2d 504(2013))中创立普通法程序以来,最高法院只处理过三次这一程序,但尚未澄清被告何时可以提出这一动议。由于普通法程序的目的是在被告无法适用《定罪后法》时作为一种替代,因此笔者认为,《内布拉斯加州定罪后法》的时间要求应适用于普通法撤回抗辩的动议。具体而言,提交人认为,应要求被告在以下一年之内提出动议:1)直接上诉结束或提出直接上诉的期限届满,判决或定罪成为最终判决之日;2)通过尽职调查可以发现宪法要求的事实谓词之日;(3)宪法主张最初被美国最高法院或内布拉斯加州最高法院承认的日期,如果新承认的权利已追溯适用于定罪后附带审查的案件。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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