{"title":"Barnett and the Constitution We Have Lost","authors":"S. Griffin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.565024","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This is a review essay of Randy Barnett's book Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton University Press, 2004). I consider Barnett's libertarian theory of constitutional law in three stages. In Part I, I criticize the external theory of political legitimacy that Barnett applies to the Constitution. I argue that this theory had nothing to do with the actual reasons the Constitution was accepted as legitimate when it was ratified. In Part II, I focus on Barnett's theory of constitutional interpretation and his account of the necessary and proper clause, the foundation of the presumption of liberty. I also critique Barnett's treatment of the Lochner era. In Part III, I examine Barnett's approach to governmental power under the Constitution, particularly with respect to the commerce clause and the state police power.","PeriodicalId":83257,"journal":{"name":"The San Diego law review","volume":"42 1","pages":"283"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The San Diego law review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.565024","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This is a review essay of Randy Barnett's book Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton University Press, 2004). I consider Barnett's libertarian theory of constitutional law in three stages. In Part I, I criticize the external theory of political legitimacy that Barnett applies to the Constitution. I argue that this theory had nothing to do with the actual reasons the Constitution was accepted as legitimate when it was ratified. In Part II, I focus on Barnett's theory of constitutional interpretation and his account of the necessary and proper clause, the foundation of the presumption of liberty. I also critique Barnett's treatment of the Lochner era. In Part III, I examine Barnett's approach to governmental power under the Constitution, particularly with respect to the commerce clause and the state police power.