Minimal selfhood

IF 1.8 4区医学 Q3 GENETICS & HEREDITY

Journal of neurogenetics Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI:10.1080/01677063.2019.1672680

R. D. V. Glasgow

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract This Perspective article outlines a concept of minimal selfhood. A central claim is that minimal selfhood is not dependent on possession of a brain, a nervous system or neurons. It will be argued instead that minimal selfhood requires intrinsically reflexive activity, specifically taking the form of self-maintenance, self-reproduction and self-containment. The implications of this in thinking about animal behavior and consciousness will be briefly discussed.

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最小的自我

这篇透视文章概述了最小自我的概念。一个核心观点是，最低限度的自我并不依赖于拥有大脑、神经系统或神经元。相反，我们会认为，最低限度的自我需要内在的反身性活动，特别是采取自我维护、自我复制和自我包容的形式。这在思考动物行为和意识方面的意义将被简要讨论。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of neurogenetics 医学-神经科学

CiteScore

4.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

>12 weeks

期刊介绍： The Journal is appropriate for papers on behavioral, biochemical, or cellular aspects of neural function, plasticity, aging or disease. In addition to analyses in the traditional genetic-model organisms, C. elegans, Drosophila, mouse and the zebrafish, the Journal encourages submission of neurogenetic investigations performed in organisms not easily amenable to experimental genetics. Such investigations might, for instance, describe behavioral differences deriving from genetic variation within a species, or report human disease studies that provide exceptional insights into biological mechanisms