{"title":"A power-dependence perspective of the pollution haven hypothesis","authors":"Ziliang Deng, Eryue Huang, Pei Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jbusres.2023.114255","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The pollution haven hypothesis has suggested that developed-country multinational enterprises (DMNEs) offshore their polluting activities to developing countries in an attempt to circumvent the stringent environmental protection regulations in their home markets. What remains unclear is why the host developing-country governments permit the above-average pollution caused by foreign subsidiaries. From a power-dependence perspective, we hypothesize that when the host developing-country governments exhibit <em>dependence</em> on advanced resources from developed countries, DMNE subsidiaries exert <em>power</em> (or influence) over the governments in regulatory discretion within the legal boundary. The unbalanced power relation grants DMNE subsidiaries the leeway to pollute more than their peers. By combining the pollution haven hypothesis with the power-dependence theory, this study highlights the heterogeneity within the local developing countries in environmental arbitrage in international business.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15123,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Research","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 114255"},"PeriodicalIF":10.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Business Research","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148296323006148","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
The pollution haven hypothesis has suggested that developed-country multinational enterprises (DMNEs) offshore their polluting activities to developing countries in an attempt to circumvent the stringent environmental protection regulations in their home markets. What remains unclear is why the host developing-country governments permit the above-average pollution caused by foreign subsidiaries. From a power-dependence perspective, we hypothesize that when the host developing-country governments exhibit dependence on advanced resources from developed countries, DMNE subsidiaries exert power (or influence) over the governments in regulatory discretion within the legal boundary. The unbalanced power relation grants DMNE subsidiaries the leeway to pollute more than their peers. By combining the pollution haven hypothesis with the power-dependence theory, this study highlights the heterogeneity within the local developing countries in environmental arbitrage in international business.
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The Journal of Business Research aims to publish research that is rigorous, relevant, and potentially impactful. It examines a wide variety of business decision contexts, processes, and activities, developing insights that are meaningful for theory, practice, and/or society at large. The research is intended to generate meaningful debates in academia and practice, that are thought provoking and have the potential to make a difference to conceptual thinking and/or practice. The Journal is published for a broad range of stakeholders, including scholars, researchers, executives, and policy makers. It aids the application of its research to practical situations and theoretical findings to the reality of the business world as well as to society. The Journal is abstracted and indexed in several databases, including Social Sciences Citation Index, ANBAR, Current Contents, Management Contents, Management Literature in Brief, PsycINFO, Information Service, RePEc, Academic Journal Guide, ABI/Inform, INSPEC, etc.
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