Distributive politics as behavioral localism: Evidence from a vignette experiment in Hungary

Abstract

Recent literature on friends-and-neighbors voting focused on explaining citizens’ motives behind supporting local candidates; the cue-based account suggests that local ties signal accountability, constituency service orientation, and policy representation. Localism was also posited to serve as a cue for distributive politics, but assumptions of voters making inferences about receiving tangible benefits once a politician from their own stock is elected were not corroborated empirically. Drawing on a survey experiment (N = 2000) fielded in Hungary, the paper provides a test of pork barrel politics and clientelism serving as manifestations of behavioral localism; that is, if voters formulate expectations of politicians engaging in aforementioned practices based on their local roots. Respondents in treatment and control group were shown the same candidate profile, fictive politicians differing only in their local roots. Results demonstrate that respondents who were told that the candidate was born and living in their hometown were more likely to believe that the politician will “bring home the bacon” as opposed to those confronted with a randomly selected Hungarian settlement as the candidate’s birthplace and residence. Findings refine our understanding of friends-and-neighbors voting, as well as voters’ expectations about likely non-programmatic behavior of elected candidates.