Generalist CEOs and the readability of the 10-K report

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the association between the general managerial ability of CEOs and the readability of 10-K reports. We find that the readability of 10-K reports is lower for firms managed by CEOs with general managerial ability. Our result is robust to change analysis, an alternate readability measure, various fixed effects, an instrumental variable approach, a propensity score approach, and an entropy balancing approach. Our additional analysis reveals that general managerial ability is negatively associated with the readability of management discussion and analysis (MD&A). Moreover, the disclosure tone of 10-K reports and MD&A is conservative when firms are managed by generalist CEOs. Our findings also reveal that CEO tenure moderates the positive association between the general ability index and Gunning Fog index of 10-K reports. Finally, we find that high investment level and misstatement strengthen the association between the general ability index and the readability of 10-K reports, thus supporting the obfuscation hypothesis. We, therefore, conclude that firms incur costs in the form of lower disclosure quality when they opt for a generalist CEO.