From the “Paris Agreement” to the “London Pact”: Political Aspects of the Democratisation of Poland’s April Constitution of 1935

Stanisław Kilian
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Abstract

In the history of Poland’s April Constitution of 1935, there were two attempts to democratise it, the first one in November 1939 referred to as the “Paris agreement” and the other one in September 1950 included in the formula of the “London pact”, both of which concerned the ways of implementing Article 13 defining the scope of the President’s personal powers. The “Paris agreement” introduced into political life the practice of consultation between the President and the Prime Minister; the “London pact” provided for a thorough change in the nature of the President’s relations with the Government and the planned Parliament-in-exile called the Council of National Unity, as well as strengthened the role of the political parties in political decision-making. Motivated by the notion of the modernisation of the Constitution and its adjustment to the democratic standards of Western states, the postulate to democratise it was put forward by established political actors, the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and the National Party (SN), supported by the Independence and Democracy (NiD) party founded in exile. Appearing together as the Political Council, they took part in negotiations on the formation of a government of national unity after the death of Prime Minister T. Tomaszewski. Representatives of the Polish People’s Party did not take part in the talks; its leader, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, rejected the April Constitution “in its entirety”. The “pact” did not gain the approval of the “Castle”: the President defended the Constitution and did not accept concessions as regards Article 13. Nevertheless, the postulates of the “pact” were not nullified as they were used to build a new political construction – the National Unity – from 1954 functioning in parallel to the presidential centre. Due to the importance of the issue, the negotiations can be regarded as a breakthrough event in the political life of the émigré community. It is no exaggeration to say that the roots of the most important political events in the life of the émigré milieu go back to the “London pact”. The research goal of this article is to bring to light the political aspects of the initiative motivated by the idea of democratising the April Constitution, expressed in the formula of the “London pact”, against the background of the hypothesis that the leaders of the Political Council, behind the screen of their demand for the modernisation of the political system, aimed at weakening the position of the President as an obstacle on the way to building a new political centre – the Unity camp. They used the stage of negotiations based on the demands of the “pact” to orchestrate an anti-presidential propaganda campaign and to portray Zaleski as an opponent of the notion of unity. At the same time, they promoted the false premise that the democratisation of political life would help unblock the channels of émigré diplomacy and change the position of the Polish cause in the international arena. In this way, taking advantage of the atmosphere of distrust towards the President, they were able to launch their own political project: the National Unity, planned for as early as in 1949. For them, their participation in the Unity’s bodies opened the possibility of realising their own political ambitions reserved for politicians from President Zaleski’s closest milieu referred to as the ‘Castle entourage’.
从“巴黎协定”到“伦敦公约”:波兰1935年4月宪法民主化的政治层面
在波兰1935年4月宪法的历史上,曾有两次将其民主化的尝试,第一次是在1939年11月被称为“巴黎协定”,另一次是在1950年9月被纳入“伦敦协定”的公式,这两次都涉及到执行第13条的方式,该条定义了总统个人权力的范围。《巴黎协定》将总统和总理之间协商的做法引入政治生活;《伦敦协定》规定彻底改变总统与政府和计划中的流亡议会民族团结委员会的关系性质,并加强各政党在政治决策中的作用。受宪法现代化及其对西方国家民主标准的调整的启发,波兰社会党(PPS)和国家党(SN)这两个老牌政治行动者在流亡的独立与民主党(NiD)的支持下提出了宪法民主化的假设。在总理托马谢夫斯基去世后,他们作为政治委员会一起参加了关于组建民族团结政府的谈判。波兰人民党的代表没有参加会谈;其领导人斯坦尼斯瓦夫·米科瓦伊奇克“全盘”拒绝接受四月宪法。“协定”没有得到“城堡”的批准:总统捍卫宪法,不接受关于第13条的让步。尽管如此,“协议”的假设并没有被废除,因为它们被用来建立一个新的政治结构——民族团结——从1954年起与总统中心平行运作。由于这个问题的重要性,谈判可以被视为移民群体政治生活中的一个突破性事件。可以毫不夸张地说,移民生活中最重要的政治事件的根源可以追溯到“伦敦协定”。本文的研究目标是揭示这一倡议的政治方面,其动机是以“伦敦公约”的形式表达的4月宪法民主化的想法,背景是政治委员会的领导人在他们要求政治制度现代化的屏幕后面,旨在削弱总统作为建立新政治中心——团结阵营道路上的障碍的地位。他们利用基于“协议”要求的谈判阶段,策划了一场反总统宣传运动,并将扎莱斯基描绘成团结理念的反对者。与此同时,他们宣扬了一个错误的前提,即政治生活的民主化将有助于畅通移民外交渠道,并改变波兰事业在国际舞台上的地位。通过这种方式,利用对总统的不信任气氛,他们得以启动自己的政治项目:早在1949年就计划好的民族团结。对他们来说,他们参加联合会的机构为实现他们自己的政治抱负打开了可能性,这是为扎莱斯基总统最亲密的环境中的政治家们保留的,被称为“城堡随行人员”。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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