The Role of the Status-Quo in Dynamic Bargaining

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS

Games Pub Date : 2023-04-28 DOI:10.3390/g14030035

Francesca Flamini

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We analyze a dynamic bargaining game where parties can agree to implement a policy change, which is costly (beneficial) in the short-run but beneficial (costly) in the long-run. When the status-quo is endogenized (at least in some components), we show that the more farsighted party can induce their rival to accept the short-run costs of policy changes designed to generate benefits in the long-run. This is more common when players’ asymmetries are less pronounced, the status-quo is fully endogenized and the state depreciates more quickly.

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现状在动态谈判中的作用

我们分析了一个动态的讨价还价游戏，各方可以同意实施政策变化，这在短期内是昂贵的（有益的），但在长期内是有益的（昂贵的）。当现状是内生的（至少在某些方面），我们表明，更有远见的政党可以促使他们的竞争对手接受旨在产生长期利益的政策变化的短期成本。当参与者的不对称性不那么明显，现状完全内生，国家贬值更快时，这种情况更为常见。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

审稿时长

11 weeks

期刊介绍： Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.