{"title":"Coordinating contingent assistance of lateral suppliers under disruption","authors":"Guanmei Liu, Rui-Sen Jiang, X. Shao","doi":"10.1080/23270012.2019.1608327","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on coordinating contingent assistance between two lateral suppliers controlled by a central firm, when one supplier is exposed to supply disruption. By comparing two scenarios where the central firm can/cannot coordinate contingent assistance, we find the coordination of contingent assistance is more efficient, thus the central firm should do that. In the scenario without coordination, if the holding cost of the disrupted supplier is low, while the opportunity cost of the reliable supplier is high relatively, allowing the reliable supplier to hold decision power of assistance price can generate more assistance quantity for the disrupted supplier and bring more profits for the central firm. However, if the holding cost is high, and the opportunity cost is low relatively, the disrupted supplier can receive more assistance quantity, and the central firm can get more profits, by letting the disrupted supplier have the power to decide assistance price.","PeriodicalId":46290,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Analytics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6000,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/23270012.2019.1608327","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Management Analytics","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23270012.2019.1608327","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
This paper focuses on coordinating contingent assistance between two lateral suppliers controlled by a central firm, when one supplier is exposed to supply disruption. By comparing two scenarios where the central firm can/cannot coordinate contingent assistance, we find the coordination of contingent assistance is more efficient, thus the central firm should do that. In the scenario without coordination, if the holding cost of the disrupted supplier is low, while the opportunity cost of the reliable supplier is high relatively, allowing the reliable supplier to hold decision power of assistance price can generate more assistance quantity for the disrupted supplier and bring more profits for the central firm. However, if the holding cost is high, and the opportunity cost is low relatively, the disrupted supplier can receive more assistance quantity, and the central firm can get more profits, by letting the disrupted supplier have the power to decide assistance price.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Management Analytics (JMA) is dedicated to advancing the theory and application of data analytics in traditional business fields. It focuses on the intersection of data analytics with key disciplines such as accounting, finance, management, marketing, production/operations management, and supply chain management. JMA is particularly interested in research that explores the interface between data analytics and these business areas. The journal welcomes studies employing a range of research methods, including empirical research, big data analytics, data science, operations research, management science, decision science, and simulation modeling.