Formalizing falsification for theories of consciousness across computational hierarchies.

IF 3.1 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, BIOLOGICAL
Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-08-05 eCollection Date: 2021-01-01 DOI:10.1093/nc/niab014
Jake R Hanson, Sara I Walker
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Abstract

The scientific study of consciousness is currently undergoing a critical transition in the form of a rapidly evolving scientific debate regarding whether or not currently proposed theories can be assessed for their scientific validity. At the forefront of this debate is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), widely regarded as the preeminent theory of consciousness because it quantified subjective experience in a scalar mathematical measure called Φ that is in principle measurable. Epistemological issues in the form of the "unfolding argument" have provided a concrete refutation of IIT by demonstrating how it permits functionally identical systems to have differences in their predicted consciousness. The implication is that IIT and any other proposed theory based on a physical system's causal structure may already be falsified even in the absence of experimental refutation. However, so far many of these arguments surrounding the epistemological foundations of falsification arguments, such as the unfolding argument, are too abstract to determine the full scope of their implications. Here, we make these abstract arguments concrete, by providing a simple example of functionally equivalent machines realizable with table-top electronics that take the form of isomorphic digital circuits with and without feedback. This allows us to explicitly demonstrate the different levels of abstraction at which a theory of consciousness can be assessed. Within this computational hierarchy, we show how IIT is simultaneously falsified at the finite-state automaton level and unfalsifiable at the combinatorial-state automaton level. We use this example to illustrate a more general set of falsification criteria for theories of consciousness: to avoid being already falsified, or conversely unfalsifiable, scientific theories of consciousness must be invariant with respect to changes that leave the inference procedure fixed at a particular level in a computational hierarchy.

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跨计算层次的意识理论证伪形式化。
对意识的科学研究目前正处于关键的转型期,其形式是一场迅速发展的科学辩论,辩论的主题是目前提出的理论是否可以评估其科学有效性。综合信息理论(IIT)是这场争论的焦点,该理论被广泛认为是最杰出的意识理论,因为它将主观体验量化为原则上可测量的标量数学尺度Φ。以 "展开论证"(unfolding argument)为形式的认识论问题,通过证明 IIT 如何允许功能完全相同的系统在其预测的意识上存在差异,对 IIT 进行了具体驳斥。这意味着,即使没有实验反驳,IIT 和其他任何基于物理系统因果结构提出的理论都可能已经被证伪。然而,到目前为止,许多围绕证伪论证的认识论基础的论证(如展开论证)都过于抽象,无法确定其全部含义。在这里,我们通过提供一个简单的例子,让这些抽象的论证具体化,即功能等同的机器可以用桌面电子设备实现,其形式是有反馈和无反馈的同构数字电路。这样,我们就能明确地展示意识理论可评估的不同抽象层次。在这个计算层次中,我们展示了 IIT 如何在有限状态自动机层次上同时被证伪,而在组合状态自动机层次上又无法被证伪。我们用这个例子来说明意识理论的一套更普遍的证伪标准:为了避免已经被证伪或反过来不可证伪,科学的意识理论必须在发生变化时保持不变,而这种变化会使推理过程固定在计算层次结构中的某个特定层次上。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Neuroscience of Consciousness Psychology-Clinical Psychology
CiteScore
6.90
自引率
2.40%
发文量
16
审稿时长
19 weeks
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