Proportional-with-Leader-Bonus rules for group-buying with invitation behavior

IF 0.8 4区管理学 Q4 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-04-04 DOI:10.1016/j.orl.2025.107285

Hang Chen , Genjiu Xu , Li Zhang

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Group-buying leverages collective purchasing power, with invitations boosting volume and profit. This paper proposes Proportional-with-Leader-Bonus (PLB) rules, allocating profit by purchasing volume and rewarding leaders for invitations. To prevent fake invitations and collusion, False-Name-Proof (FNP) and Consolidation-Proof (CP) are analyzed. Leader Income Consistency (LIC) and Bilateral Ratio Consistency (BRC) ensure fair leader rewards and balance purchasing volume and invitations. The PLB rules are axiomatically characterized by Single-person efficiency, FNP, CP, LIC, and BRC, providing a robust framework for fair profit allocation.

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来源期刊

Operations Research Letters 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

9.10%

发文量

111

审稿时长

83 days

期刊介绍： Operations Research Letters is committed to the rapid review and fast publication of short articles on all aspects of operations research and analytics. Apart from a limitation to eight journal pages, quality, originality, relevance and clarity are the only criteria for selecting the papers to be published. ORL covers the broad field of optimization, stochastic models and game theory. Specific areas of interest include networks, routing, location, queueing, scheduling, inventory, reliability, and financial engineering. We wish to explore interfaces with other fields such as life sciences and health care, artificial intelligence and machine learning, energy distribution, and computational social sciences and humanities. Our traditional strength is in methodology, including theory, modelling, algorithms and computational studies. We also welcome novel applications and concise literature reviews.