Comparative statics in strategic form games

IF 2.1 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112247

Juan F. Escobar

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper presents new comparative statics results for strategic form games. We introduce a dominance condition that ensures payoff shocks result in increased Nash equilibria, even in games without strategic complementarities. Our results are easy to apply and expand the range of games where lattice theoretic tools can be applied. We derive new comparative statics results for contests and Cournot games.

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来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.