{"title":"Teams versus individuals in pre-play cheap talk communication","authors":"Huanxing Yang , Zexin Ye , Lan Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102325","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a lab experiment, we compare team and individual play in a coordination game with incomplete information, with and without pre-play cheap talk communication. We find that when both agents are of middle types, teams perform slightly better than individuals without communication but significantly worse with communication. Consequently, cheap talk precommunication does not improve coordination when both teams are of middle types due to the fact that with communication teams exaggerate their types significantly more and are more likely to choose their preferred action conditional on messages sent when they are of middle types.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 102325"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324001629","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In a lab experiment, we compare team and individual play in a coordination game with incomplete information, with and without pre-play cheap talk communication. We find that when both agents are of middle types, teams perform slightly better than individuals without communication but significantly worse with communication. Consequently, cheap talk precommunication does not improve coordination when both teams are of middle types due to the fact that with communication teams exaggerate their types significantly more and are more likely to choose their preferred action conditional on messages sent when they are of middle types.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly the Journal of Socio-Economics) welcomes submissions that deal with various economic topics but also involve issues that are related to other social sciences, especially psychology, or use experimental methods of inquiry. Thus, contributions in behavioral economics, experimental economics, economic psychology, and judgment and decision making are especially welcome. The journal is open to different research methodologies, as long as they are relevant to the topic and employed rigorously. Possible methodologies include, for example, experiments, surveys, empirical work, theoretical models, meta-analyses, case studies, and simulation-based analyses. Literature reviews that integrate findings from many studies are also welcome, but they should synthesize the literature in a useful manner and provide substantial contribution beyond what the reader could get by simply reading the abstracts of the cited papers. In empirical work, it is important that the results are not only statistically significant but also economically significant. A high contribution-to-length ratio is expected from published articles and therefore papers should not be unnecessarily long, and short articles are welcome. Articles should be written in a manner that is intelligible to our generalist readership. Book reviews are generally solicited but occasionally unsolicited reviews will also be published. Contact the Book Review Editor for related inquiries.