Research on the Collaborative Mechanism of Value Creation in Public–Private Partnership Projects Under Dynamic Trust

IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Zehui Bu, Jicai Liu, Zujie Lu
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Public–private partnership (PPP) is now focused on project value creation, with trust playing a crucial role. This study models trust evolution among stakeholders using evolutionary game theory and simulations, revealing that higher initial and sustained trust boosts project value. However, overreliance on trust can lead to deregulation and neglect of contracts, harming outcomes. Spillover effects and speculative behavior also threaten value creation. The study identifies an optimal incentive range for reputation gains, highlighting the need for balanced trust mechanisms, effective incentives, and penalties to ensure collaboration and project success.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
18.20%
发文量
242
期刊介绍: Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.
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