The sovereign climate debt trap and natural disaster clauses

IF 1.3 3区社会学 Q3 BUSINESS

American Business Law Journal Pub Date : 2024-11-18 DOI:10.1111/ablj.12253

Stephen Kim Park, Tim R Samples

引用次数: 0

Abstract

The growing prevalence and magnitude of climate-related natural disasters are perpetuating a climate debt trap in which recovery costs compound over time, progressively eroding the capacity of governments to obtain financing to respond to them. How can countries participating in global financial markets respond? This article focuses on natural disaster clauses in sovereign debt contracts, which enable a national government to temporarily suspend payments to its creditors when a natural disaster strikes the country. Natural disaster clauses are analyzed and critiqued as an example of contract innovation amidst ongoing debates about legal reform of the global financial system in response to climate change.

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来源期刊

American Business Law Journal Multiple-

CiteScore

1.10

自引率

16.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： The ABLJ is a faculty-edited, double blind peer reviewed journal, continuously published since 1963. Our mission is to publish only top quality law review articles that make a scholarly contribution to all areas of law that impact business theory and practice. We search for those articles that articulate a novel research question and make a meaningful contribution directly relevant to scholars and practitioners of business law. The blind peer review process means legal scholars well-versed in the relevant specialty area have determined selected articles are original, thorough, important, and timely. Faculty editors assure the authors’ contribution to scholarship is evident. We aim to elevate legal scholarship and inform responsible business decisions.